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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, a citizen of Franklin County whose ownership of property was slandered by

a rogue county assessor who mistakenly told the power company that the Plaintiff did not
own property over which he had granted an easement, tried diligently for over eight months
to settle the matter with the Assessor, to no avail. Finally, during a court ordered mediation
Plaintiff found out why. The Assessor came to the mediation and offered nothing to resolve
the massive amount of attorney fees Plaintiff had incurred in getting the Assessor to finally
retract his slanderous letter. Plaintiff was informed that ICRMP insured the Assessor and
would not authorize the payment of any settlement. Plaintiff read Idaho Code § 12-117(3),
which has never been interpreted by any court, and determined that ICRMP's practice of
insuring local government officials so that they have no skin in the game when it comes to
negotiating with their constituents, flies in the face of the purpose of that law. Plaintiff filed
this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the ICRMP regime is illegal under Idaho
Code§ 12-117(3) which requires a local government official who is sued for acting without a
reasonable basis in fact or law for his actions, to pay attorney fees to his wronged constituent
out of his local operating budget .

Diligently pursuing this case, Plaintiff sent out discovery

requests within one ( 1) day of the answer being filed. Those discovery requests go to the
heart of the matter. Defendant refused to answer. Plaintiff filed a motion to compel, and
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.

The gist of Defendant's argument was

that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring a "direct action" against an insurer such as ICRMP.
Plaintiff argued directly to the trial court that it was not appropriate to entertain a motion for
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summary judgment when a motion to compel discovery directed to the material heart of the
matter was pending. That it is imprudent to decide important social issues in an evidentiary
vacuum. The trial court refused to rule on Plaintiff's motion to compel taking the position
that a Rule 56(f) affidavit spelling out the discovery needed, how it would lead to discovery
of material admissible evidence and why the discovery had not been pursued earlier was
missing. While that would be the expected response in a case that had been pending for any
length of time and discovery had been neglected by the Plaintiff, it was a surprising ruling in
the posture of this case. That decision completely ignores the fact that the discovery had
already been propounded, that Defendants inappropriately refused to respond to the
discovery, and that a ruling on a party's standing to pursue an action should not be made in
an evidentiary vacuum.

The court proceeded to judgment without affording the Plaintiff

due process on his motion to compel discovery and determined, based on cases where a third
party was trying to bootstrap itself into insurance benefits they had never bought, determined
that Plaintiff lacked standing. That ruling fails to take into account the material distinction
between this case and the cases the court relied upon. In this case Plaintiff was not seeking
benefits under an insurance policy, but was seeking to challenge the lawfulness of an
insurance regime that undermines the legislature's intent to bring some modicum of
reasonableness to local government by requiring the government actors to have skin in the
game by at least having to pay attorney fee awards for frivolous conduct out of their local
operating budget. The trial court's decision should be reversed and this case remanded to
allow discovery to be completed followed by an orderly trial on the merits.
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A. Nature of the Case
This case asks for a review and reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment
early on in the case (within 151 days of the complaint being filed) while a motion to compel
discovery going to the heart of the issues in the case was pending.

B. Statement of the Facts 1
1. In November 2007 the parents of the Plaintiff, Val D Westover, entered into a

contract whereby they sold the family farm to Val and his wife, LaRee. That
contract called for a warranty deed to be recorded upon successful payment of
the purchase price over the next few years. A memorandum of that sales
contract was recorded with the Franklin County Recorder's office in
November 2007. That memorandum was properly acknowledged by all the
signers. See Appendix, Exhibit B; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 159.
2. On or about April 20, 2015, Val and Laree Westover, as part of a contract to
receive power from Rocky Mountain Power, conveyed an easement to the
power company and paid over $37,000 for installation of lines and equipment
for the purpose of receiving power. See Appendix, Exhibit C; Clerk's Record
on Appeal, p. 160.
3. On May 29, 2015, the Assessor sent a letter to Rocky Mountain Power telling
them that the property over which Val and Laree Westover had conveyed an

1 The background facts given here for context are supported in the record in the case Westover v. Cundick, CV2015-312; Supreme Court number 44046.
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easement to Rocky Mountain Power "is not owned by the Grantor." See
Appendix, Exhibit A; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 160.
4. Rocky Mountain Power contacted Plaintiff Val Westover and told him that if
the matter was not corrected the power company would shut off power and
remove its equipment. Mr. Westover assured the power company that he did
own the property and he would get the Assessor to correct their false
statements.
5. Val Westover was told by a power company official that he would hold off on
demanding that the service be terminated while Val Westover attempted to get
the slander of his ownership of the property corrected.
6. Val Westover immediately contacted the assessor's office and requested that
the error in the letter be corrected. He was told by an employee of the office,
Denise Ralphs, that they would not correct the error. Mr. Westover then met
with Jase Cundick, the county assessor who again refused to correct the error.
7. Counsel for the W estovers called the Assessor several times but did not
receive a return phone call. Thereafter, counsel for the Westovers sent a letter
to the Assessor pointing out why their statement that the property over which
the easement was granted "is not owned by the Grantor" was incorrect, and
requested that he write a letter to the power company retracting the claims
made in the May 29, 2015 Jetter. See Appendix, Exhibit D; Clerk's Record on
Appeal, p. 160. No response to that letter was received from the Assessor. A
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lawsuit against the Assessor followed. Westover v. Cundick, CV-2015-312;
Supreme Court number 44046. Several months and several thousands of
dollars in attorney fees later the Assessor finally retracted his slanderous letter
to the power company thus resolving the title issue. Westovers moved to
dismiss the slander of title claims and the interference claims, but asked the
Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the Assessor from issuing letters
that slander title in the future. The Assessor took the position that no writ
should issue because he was not currently issuing any such letters. He did
however take the position that he would do so again in the future.
COURT: Would you say this is a practice throughout the state?
RESPONDENTS' COUNSEL: Sending letters in general is a practice.
Supreme Court Audio Transcript #44046 held February 17, 2017 at 13 :31,
See Appendix, Exhibit H.
8. The trial court dismissed the Westovers' claims on the ground that the proper
remedy was an injunction and Westovers had mistakenly asked for a writ of
prohibition. See Appendix, Exhibit E; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 232-241.
9. This Court affirmed that decision. 2017 Opinion No. 33. See Appendix,
Exhibit G.
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10. At a court ordered mediation, after the Assessor had issued its retraction letter,
the Assessor refused to participate in any meaningful way. The Assessor
refused to offer any amounts in settlement of the enormous amount of attorney
fees it had required to get the Assessor to retract its slanderous letter.
11. When pressed, the Assessor revealed that ICRMP was controlling the
litigation and would not authorize the Assessor to offer any amounts in
settlement.
12. Plaintiff prevailed in its underlying litigation with the Assessor.
a. This Court in its ruling upholding the trial court's dismissal of
Plaintiffs writ of mandamus/writ of prohibition claim, in dicta,
mistakenly took the position that the Plaintiff was not "the party in
whose favor" the judgment was rendered. 2017 Opinion No. 33, p. 5.
See Appendix, Exhibit G. That dicta was incorrect. Plaintiff brought
the action against the Assessor because the Assessor had mistakenly
told the power company that Plaintiff did not own the property over
which he had granted a power easement. Despite repeated attempts by
the Plaintiff to persuade the Assessor to correct his false statements, a
formal demand from the Plaintiff, and several months of litigation, the
Assessor, in what one member of this Court described as "pigheaded"
would not retract the slanderous statements.

10

THE COURT: I guess what I'm struggling with is this
pigheaded insistence of the prerogative to send letters like this in
the future."

Supreme Court Audio Transcript #44046 held February 17, 2017
at 14:03; See Appendix, Exhibit I.

After 8 months oflitigation and tens of thousands of dollars in attorney
fees, the Assessor finally retracted the letter. In most judicial systems, that
result would be accounted a win by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Equal Access
to Justice Act allows for recovery of attorney's fees in actions against
federal defendants where the federal agency's position was substantially
unjustified. Under 28 USC, Section 1988 an award of fees in Section
1983 actions against state and local officials is available when the
government official's conduct was not substantially justified. In
California under CCP 1021.5, litigants with government officials are
allowed to recover fees where they have made good-faith efforts to resolve
the issue without litigation.

13. Plaintiff would appreciate this Court correcting the earlier dicta to properly
reflect that Plaintiff succeeded in his efforts to get the "pigheaded" Assessor
to finally correct his slander by issuing a retraction letter to the power
company.
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ISSUES
1. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to rule on Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery
before granting summary judgment in a case barely five months old where Plaintiff had
been actively seeking discovery going to the heart of the issues in the case and had filed a
motion to compel discovery answers going to the material issues raised in the case?
2. Did the Trial Court err in determining that Plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the
illegal conduct of ICRMP in insuring local government officials against attorney fees
imposed for arbitrary conduct the legislature determined in I. C. § 12-117 (3) should be
paid out of the offending official's operating budget where that insurance led the
Assessor to be "pigheaded" and stubbornly litigious costing Plaintiff thousands of dollars
in attorney fees to finally get the Assessor to retract his slander?

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO ICRMP
WHILE PLAINTIFF'S TIMELY MOTION TO COMPEL WAS PENDING
WITHOUT FIRST RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
DEPRIVED THE PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW.
This case was barely five months old when the trial court granted summary judgment

to the Defendant Idaho Counties Risk Management Program. Plaintiff had been very
diligent in attempting to move the case along. On June 24, 2016, just one day after ICRMP
filed its answer, Plaintiff served its first set of discovery requests going to the heart of this
controversy. Defendant served responses that can only be described as obstructionist.
Plaintiff fulfilled its responsibility under the rules to attempt informal resolution of
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Defendant's inappropriate failure to respond to discovery. On August 15, 2016, Plaintiff sent
a letter to ICRMP's lawyer pointing out the deficiencies in its responses. See Appendix,
Exhibit F; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 220-225. Rather than respond to that letter, ICRMP
filed its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed its motion to compel discovery and in
its response to the motion for summary judgment, brought that motion to compel discovery
to the court's attention and spelled out why the discovery needed to be produced in order for
the Court to proceed with a fully informed decision on the merits of the Plaintiff's claims.
The Court nevertheless proceeded to summary judgment, with Plaintiff's motion to compel
still pending and refused to decide Plaintiff's motion to compel. The court based its neglect
of Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery by asserting that Plaintiff's counsel had failed to
file a Rule 56( d) affidavit. A Rule 56( d) affidavit would appear inapposite to the decision a
trial court must make when confronted with a motion to compel the very discovery the
plaintiff has already sought but which has been improperly withheld. The rule makes it clear
that the Court has much broader power when confronted with reluctant parties, and the
concept of due process would appear to be applicable when a party has asked the Court to
rule on a motion to compel before proceeding to summary judgment.
Under the rule:

(e) Failing to Properly Support or Address a Fact. If a party fails to properly
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c), the court may:
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( 1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials, including the facts
considered undisputed, show that the movant is entitled to it; or
(4) issue any other appropriate order.
In light of the Plaintiffs diligent pursuit of discovery and a vigorous motion to compel
discovery that had been wrongfully withheld, the court had power under Rule 56( e) to "issue
any other appropriate order." In the context of this case, the other appropriate order would
have been a ruling on Plaintiff's motion to compel that was pending before it at the time it
ruled on the motion for summary judgment. The motion to compel was addressed in the
opposition to the motion for summary judgment and was presented as the reason why the
trial court should not have undertaken decision on a matter of significant social importance in
an evidentiary vacuum. Indeed, to grant summary judgment in the context of this case, with
diligent discovery having been pursued by the Plaintiff against an obstructionist Defendant,
and a timely motion to compel pending at the time of the summary judgment decision is a
violation of Plaintiffs right to due process under the law.
This Court has held that a plaintiff must avail itself of the tools provided by the rules
to obtain the facts needed to pursue the case and the court cannot act sua sponte even in the
face of recalcitrant and abusive conduct by a defendant. Morgan v. Demos, 321 P. 3d 732
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(Id. 2014); Frost v. Hofmeister, 554 P. 2d 935 (Id. 1976). Here Plaintiff diligently pursued
the facts, was improperly stonewalled by the Defendants, and was left without relief by the
Court when a timely motion to compel was filed. That course of dealing does not comport
with our notions of fair play and substantial justice as required by the due process
requirements of the Idaho and the United States Constitutions.
In Sanders v. Kuma Joint School Dist. 876 P.2d 154, 125 Idaho 872 (1994) this Court
quoted as follows from the United States Supreme Court:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. ... " (emphasis added).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
( 1986) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff was not accorded "adequate time for discovery." In a case where this
Court upheld the granting of summary judgment because a Rule 56(£) affidavit was
inadequate to set out the demands of Rule 56(£), the Court noted that the case had been
pending for over a year and the Plaintiff had not undertaken the discovery it claimed it
needed. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 141 Idaho 233 (2005). By contrast,
in this case, Plaintiff was doing all it could do to obtain responses to its discovery from a
recalcitrant opponent and received no help from the court in response to his motion to
compel. The reason why summary judgment was premature in this case was obvious from
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the Plaintiff having filed the motion to compel and pointing out to the court that the pendency
of that motion and the defendants stonewalling of discovery made it imprudent to address the
serious social and legal issues addressed by Plaintiffs complaint in an evidentiary vacuum.
The court simply rushed to judgment on Plaintiffs complaints about an insurance regime that
flies in the face of important legislative purpose without affording Plaintiff the procedural
rights our constitutions and orderly procedure require.
On June 24, 2016, the day after Defendant answered the complaint, Plaintiff Val D
Westover served discovery requests on ICRMP. On July 19, 2016, ICRMP responded to
requests for admission, but refused to respond to interrogatories or document requests and
instead filed a motion for protective order claiming that there are no factual issues in the case
and the case is merely a legal question of whether local subdivisions may legally purchase
insurance. After fulfilling his duty under the rules to confer and consult before filing a
motion to compel, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel. Before the motion for protective order
and Plaintiffs cross motion to compel could be heard, ICRMP filed a motion for summary
judgment. Without ruling on Plaintiffs motion to compel the Court proceeded to summary
judgment.
Our Rules of Civil Procedure define the scope of discovery. Rule 26(b)( 1)(A)
provides the simple formula:
General Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, including the existence, description,
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nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.
Tellingly, the rule continues: "Relevant information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." Issues relating to what might be admissible at trial are not litigated at the
discovery stage. Mr. Westover's discovery was specifically directed to the question of
whether ICRMP policies interfere with the legislative directive found in Idaho Code § 12117 designed to bring accountability to local government by making them feel the
consequence of their conduct in their operating budget, thus giving them incentive to avoid
the type of litigation that occurred in this case. Statement of Purpose, S.B. 1332 (2012). Mr.
Westover's discovery is aimed precisely at that pivotal point and is highly likely to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence about the purpose and effect of ICRMP insurance.
Interrogatory No. 1 is a typical request to provide a factual basis for failing to admit
critical issues in the case. Such interrogatories not only help frame the issues that might be
ultimately tried, but provide a buffer against the type of evasive answers to requests for
admission that were submitted in this case. ICRMP's answers to those requests for
admission are a model of obfuscation whenever the request neared the critical issues in this
case.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #1: Admit that you have the duty and the right to

defend your members against lawsuits brought against them by citizens subject to their
jurisdiction.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it is contractually obligated to provide a defense
to its insureds when they are sued for claims that are potentially entitled to coverage under
the ICRMP insurance policy. ICRMP denies the remainder of Request No. 1.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #2: Admit that you have the right to control the

litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it has a contractual right to make strategic
decisions concerning litigation involving claims that are entitled to coverage under the
ICRMP policy. Defendant denies the remainder of Request No. 2.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #3: Admit that you have the right to control settlement

and mediation of litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 2, above.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #7: Admit that on July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed an

action against the Franklin County Assessor in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Case
No. CV-2015-312. ("The Assessor Lawsuit")
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RESPONSE: It is admitted that there exists a case styled Westover v. Cundick, et al,
Case No. CV-2015-312 in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Franklin County, Idaho.
When specifically asked requests for admission on the ultimate issues in this lawsuit
(which is specifically allowed under Rule 30, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure),
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #4: Admit that you have the duty to pay any expenses
awarded against your members in lawsuits tendered to you by your members, including
actions covered by Idaho Code Section 12-117.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #11: Admit that you refused to authorize the Franklin
County Assessor to pay any money in settlement of the Assessor Lawsuit during that
mediation.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is
ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to
pay those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a
legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
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controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #14: Admit that any payment that you make toward
attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will be paid from
funds you collect and pool from all your members.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,
and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #15: Admit that any payment that you make toward
attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will not be paid
from funds in the regular operating budget of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,
and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
ICRMP denied the requests, hence the need for a response to the first interrogatory
spelling out the factual basis for denial. Similarly, in response to a requests about the
jurisdictional basis for this lawsuit, Plaintiff was given evasive answers:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #6: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is a
political subdivision.
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RESPONSE: Denied as phrased.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #8: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is
and was at the time the Assessor Lawsuit was filed one of your members.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request as phrased is a compound request. It is admitted
only that Franklin County was an insured ofICRMP. The remainder of the request is
denied.

See Appendix, Exhibit L, p.p. 4-7; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p.p. 189-192.

Obviously, the contract by which ICRMP was obligated to provide a defense to the
lawsuit brought by Mr. Westover against the Assessor (Interrogatory No. 2), may shed light
on whether the insurance practices of ICRMP undermine the legislative purposes of LC.
§ 12-117. If that contract provides that ICRMP will pay a judgment for attorney fees despite
a ruling by the Court that the assessor acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law," the
purposes of LC. § 12-117 will be thwarted. Curiously, in response to Request for Admission
No. 13, ICRMP instead of giving a forthright admission or denial as required by the rules,
instead obfuscated by reference to this contract that it now refuses to produce!

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is
ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to
pay those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.
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RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a

legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.
Interrogatory No. 3 is directly to the point: "Please identify the source of any
payments that have been made, or that will be made or for which there is an obligation to be
made to reimburse attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit in the event that a
court orders the Franklin County Assessor to pay attorney fees in connection with that
lawsuit." Any payment of attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor lawsuit will be on the
basis that the Assessor's position in that lawsuit was "without a reasonable basis in fact or
law." The legislature specifically required that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or
political subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating
budget of the state agency or political subdivision." LC. § 12-117 (3 ). Obviously, if ICRMP
were obligated to pay those fees and is the source of those payments the legislative purpose
in making sure that irresponsible actions by local government officials is felt at the local
level so as to be a deterrent to future local government irresponsibility and litigation will be
undermined.
The remaining three interrogatories (mistakenly all numbered No. 3) simply ask for
the identifying information relating to witnesses, expert witnesses, and persons with
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knowledge of the facts.

Rule 26 specifically makes that information discoverable. Rule

26(b )(1 )(A). It is difficult to imagine a proper objection to such information.

Mr. Westover's document requests were similarly all seeking discoverable evidence
and were specifically aimed at facts relevant to the pivotal issue in this case of whether a
local government official has purchased insurance that has the potential of thwarting the goal
of I. C. § 12-117 to bring accountability to local government conduct by requiring them to pay
attorney fees incurred by their constituents fighting battles that should never have been
fought.

Mr. Westover is entitled to due process on his motion to compel. The case should be
remanded for decision on the motion to compel and an orderly trial on the merits after
discovery is completed.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF DID
NOT HA VE ST ANDING TO CHALLENGE AN INSURANCE REGIME
THAT UNDERMINES THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO GIVE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT SKIN IN THE GAME.
Anyone in business understands how difficult it is to negotiate with a party who has no

skin in the game. When someone is spending someone else's money it is hard to get them to act
reasonably in the resolution of conflict. That is exactly the situation Plaintiff found himself in
during the long months trying to get the Assessor to retract his slander and during the mediation
with the Assessor. In fact, the Assessor told the mediator that they could not make any offer of
settlement because ICRMP would not authorize them to spend any money to settle the dispute.
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This case is a case of first impression. Neither party nor the court could find a case that
interprets LC. § 12-117. See Appendix, Exhibit E; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 232. We are
left without prior judicial decision to aid in interpretation of the statute or who fits within the
class of people entitled to seek enforcement of the statute.
That being said, Plaintiff is one of a very few citizens in a position to challenge the
legality ofICRMP in light of the legislative pronouncement in LC.§ 12-117. The trial court
found that it was at least arguable that Plaintiff had standing under LC.§ 10-1202 (the
declaratory judgment statute), but ruled otherwise.
One can certainly argue that LC. § 10-1202 is a "statutory provision" authorizing such
an action. The prefatory phrase of LC.§ 10-1212 is "any interested person", without
limiting language in the statute; the phrase can certainly be interpreted broadly enough
to include Westover under the facts of this case. Certainly utilizing a broad definition of
"any interested person" Westover is interested in the insurance relationship between
ICRMP and Franklin County to the extent outlined in his Complaint.
See Appendix, Exhibit E, p. 7; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 238.
The Declaratory Judgment Statute reads:
PERSON INTERESTED OR AFFECTED MAY HA VE DECLARATION. Any person
interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or any
oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
Plaintiff claims standing, based on the above statute, through I.C. § 12-117 that requires
local government to bear the brunt of their frivolous conduct out of their operating budget
which will result in "a disincentive to such suits" Statement of Purpose, S.B. 1332
(20 l 2)(legislative history of amendments to IC 12-117).
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Plaintiff in this case had his business interfered with to the tune of thousands of dollars
by frivolous conduct of a local government official who, having no skin in the game, was "pig
headed" in his refusal to retract a slanderous letter he had no business writing in the first place.
He seeks to challenge a practice, under § 12-117 that thwarts the legislative intent to make that
local government official more responsive to the needs of their constituents by having to feel
the cost he has caused his constituents to incur. It is hard to imagine anyone who can have a
greater claim to standing to challenge ICRMP' s facilitation of a violation of§ 12-117, which
removes the very incentive for responsive and rational government the statute was designed to
foster, than Plaintiff.

The cases on which the trial court relied to deny Plaintiff standing deal

with a plaintiff who is suing an insurance company seeking coverage under the policy and
seeking to enforce the insurance coverage under a contract the insurer had with a third party.
The main case on which the trial court rested its decision is Brooksby v. Geico General Ins. Co.,
153 Idaho 546,286 P. 3d 182 (2012) (" Brooksby.") In that case the daughter of the insured
who was injured through the alleged negligent driving of her father was attempting a direct
action against the insurance company to claim benefits under the policy. The Supreme Court
held that such a direct action against the insurer was not allowed. The daughter who was not a
party to the insurance contract could not seek a direct action to recover under the insurance
contract. That decision makes perfect sense, and, unlike this case, does not run the risk that the
insurance company being immune to the effects of the law. The courts did not need to allow the
daughter to sue in order for justice to be done, because the insured, the father was in the best
position to enforce the insurance contract and had full incentive to do so. In this case by
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contrast, Val Westover is not seeking to enforce the insurance contract, but instead to invalidate
the practice of insuring the local government official against the consequence of his illegal
conduct and his pig headedness about it. If Val Westover is not allowed to sue, who will?
Neither the Assessor nor ICRMP has any incentive to scrutinize the insurance regime for
compliance with the government purposes under LC. § 12-117(3).
Plaintiff is not seeking to have the insurance enforced. Quite the opposite, Plaintiff feels
that ICRMP and what it is doing is illegal, and prevented him from having interaction with a
local government official in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation based on the facts and law
and not on personality. He is not seeking to bootstrap himself into the insurance pool, but is
seeking to have it disbanded as an illegal attack of the legislation set out in I.C. § 12-117. It is
the existence of the insurance pool itself that is the violation of§ 12-117. Plaintiff does not
seek any recovery from or under the policy. Such a claim would be barred by Brooks by, but is
not Plaintiff's claim in this case. Plaintiff is not making a claim that can be accurately
characterized as a "direct action claim" against the insurance policy. Again, Plaintiff is
claiming the very existence of the insurance pool violates I.C. § 12-117, not that he has any
right to recover anything under the policy.
III.

THE COURTS NEED TO ANALYZE J.C.§ 12-117 TO DETERMINE IF THE
ACTIVITIES OF ICRMP INTERFERE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
BEHIND THAT STATUTE
The trial court decision assumes that standing is a static concept. That approach led to

error in this case. Standing cannot be determined by any bright line analysis. Standing cannot
be used to immunize persons or entities from the legislative will as enacted in our statutes.
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Standing must be evaluated in the context of the facts of the case in order for the Court to
determine whether the proponent of a legal proposition is the proper party to assert that claim,
and whether in the absence of action by that person the illegal conduct will go unchecked. It is
not a simple proposition. First, the Court must weigh all the facts and determine whether the
Plaintiff is within the class that the legislature sought to protect. If he is, the inquiry ends and
the Court must find standing.

Even if it is not clear that the legislature intended to benefit this particular Plaintiff, there
may still be standing. LC. § I 0-1202 provides that a party may sue based on a violation of a
statute. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that: "When deciding whether a party has standing,
we have looked to decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance." Kock v. Canyon

County, 177 P.3d 372, 375; 145 Idaho 158 (Idaho 2008). A party has standing to claim a
statutory violation if that party has suffered or is about to suffer an "injury in fact" to his interests
by a violation of a statute. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). The
alleged injury may be as non-specific as "ham1 ... that affects the recreational or even the mere
esthetic interests of the plaintiff' to suffice as support for standing. Id. The requirement that a
party has standing assures that there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in
order to protect the interests of the complaining party. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff has alleged he was damaged by a Franklin County official's illegal
act and that ICRMP's providing of an insurance policy in violation of LC. § 12-117 had a
significant effect on both the commission of the illegal act and the county's approach to the
request that he retract his slanderous statement in settlement and or defending Plaintiffs claims.
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The essence of the Plaintiff's complaint is that the Franklin County assessor's office would have
acted differently both in issuing the slanderous letter and in refusing to remedy the wrong they
had committed against plaintiff, had they not been insured by ICRMP. This firmly shows the
allegation ofa specific injury caused to Plaintiff in connection with LC.§ 12-117(3).
In the cases cited by the Defendant, the insurance company will not escape the
obligations of its contract if the third party is not allowed to pursue the insurance coverage
because there is a more direct candidate for holding an insurance company liable-namely the
insured. In Brooksby v. Geico General Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546,286 P. 3d 182 (2012) for
instance the plaintiff's father already had a claim against the insurance company. In this case
the trial court could not point to anybody who will enforce the legislative dictates of LC.§ 12117(3) if plaintiff cannot. If Plaintiff is not allowed to do so, who will? Franklin County
obviously will not. It is not obvious that there is anyone else who will do so.
If Val Westover, whose business was impacted to the tune of several thousands of

dollars by the frivolous conduct of the assessor sticking his nose into private business
transactions and getting it wrong cannot challenge a practice that shields the assessor's office
from the consequences of its actions contrary to clear legislative pronouncement, who can?
One can certainly argue that LC.§ 10-1202 is a "statutory provision" authorizing such
an action. The prefatory phase of LC.§ 10-1212 is "any interested person", without
limiting language in the statute; the phrase can certainly be interpreted broadly enough
to include Westover under the facts of this case. Certainly utilizing a broad definition of
"any interested person" Westover is interested in the insurance relationship between
ICRMP and Franklin County to the extent outlined in his Complaint.
See Appendix, Exhibit E, p. 7; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 238.
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That reasoning by the trial court should have resulted in a finding of standing in this case.
In this case, Plaintiffs injury was the failure of the Assessor to make a good faith effort to
determine the legality of his actions and then to not persist in them simply because "there is no
authority to prohibit him from doing it!" See Appendix, Exhibit J, p.p. 15-16; Clerk's Record on
Appeal, p. 194.
Likewise the Assessor would appear to have had a duty to take part in court ordered
mediation in the case of Westover v. Franklin County Assessor Case No. CV-2015-312 in good
faith. The reason the Assessor did not participate in the mediation in good faith is because
ICRMP was directing that litigation and instructed the Assessor not to participate in a
meaningful way at the mediation. ICRMP would be liable to pay any settlement amount, rather
than Franklin County directly from its operating budget as LC. § 12-117(3) requires. It appears
obvious that the Assessor would be much more inclined to resolve the matter by settlement, and
would have retracted his slanderous letter early on, if any settlement were to be paid by the
County directly. One of the purposes of this legislation is to act as "a disincentive to such

suits" Statement of Purpose, S.B. 1332 (20 l 2)(legislative history of amendments to IC 12-117).
That that intended "disincentive" was neutralized by the ICRMP insurance is enough of an
"injury in fact" to support standing.

The legislature of this state has evinced its intent that this statute be given a broad berth.
Recently the Idaho Supreme Court tried to limit the effectiveness of J.C. § 12-117(3) in
curtailing the abuse of local government. See, Smith v. Washington County, 149 Idaho 787, 241
P .3d 960 (2010). The legislature responded with amendments in 2012 that made it clear their
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intent that Idaho Code 12-117(3) was not to be watered down by the courts to prevent its full
impact in protecting citizens from local governments and to dis-incentivize such conduct:

Until the summer of 2009, Idaho Code Section 12-117 was interpreted by the Idaho
Supreme Court to allow an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in
administrative cases if the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. Following an Idaho Supreme Court ruling in the summer of 2009 which reinterpreted
the statute to bar such awards, HB 421 was passed by the 2010 Legislature and signed into
law with the objective of allowing such awards at all stages of an administrative proceeding,
including on appeal to the courts. Nonetheless, on October 6, 2010 the Idaho Supreme Court
ruled in Smith v. Washington County, 149 Idaho 787, 241 P.3d 960 (2010), that the 2010
amendments did not accomplish this objective. This bill adds additional language to Idaho
Code Section 12-117 to correct this situation. It also amends Idaho Code Section 12-117 to
cover health districts (which are not technically regarded as state agencies), to provide that
the prevailing party in lawsuits between governmental entities is entitled to recover attorney
fees and costs as a disincentive to such suits, and to make technical corrections.
Statement of Purpose, S.B. 1332 (2012).
Significantly more damaging to the ameliorative effects of the statute than the slight
curtailment attempted by the courts has been the effect of the ICRMP regime of insurance that
Plaintiff is attacking in this case.
Plaintiff has alleged that ICRMP (as well as the Franklin County Assessor), under the
circumstances of the case, violated the intent and purpose of I. C. § 12-117 (3) by providing
insurance for any loss incurred because of the Assessor's unreasonable actions, rather than
requiring the Assessor to pay directly out of his operating funds as the statute requires. This
violation caused harm to Plaintiff by the Assessor stubbornly refusing to retract his false
statements about the Plaintiff's title to the property and by not participating in good faith in court
ordered mediation. Plaintiff has standing to bring this case against ICRMP.
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IV.

WHETHER ICRMP MADE THE RIGHT CALL IN NOT PARTICIPATING
IN THE MEDIATION IN GOOD FAITH IS NOT RELEVANT

ICRMP makes the argument that it made the correct call when it would not allow the
Assessor to offer any settlement at the mediation because when the parties returned to court the
Assessor prevailed in having Mr. Westover's claims for writ of mandamus/prohibition
dismissed.

That argument misses the point for two reasons. The Westover's complaint was

dismissed, not because the court found that the Assessor's conduct had been lawful. But, at least
in part, because the Plaintiff had already succeeded in obtaining a retraction from the Assessor
and writ of mandamus/prohibition was not the proper vehicle for preventing continued errant
conduct by a local government official. Indeed, the Court chastised the Assessor for inserting
himself into this real estate transaction only because no statute prohibited him from doing so.
THE COURT: Enough of this for a minute. Mr. Williams, why is your client so intent on
picking this fight, which seems to exceed perhaps what his role as an elected official with
the Franklin County Assessor's office would be? Why does he concern himself with this
issue?
MR. WILLIAMS: We attempted to resolve this matter back in August. We sent a letter to
Mr. Atkin that said basically this is moot, there's now a deed in place.
THE COURT: But that's not my question. Why did he involve himself in the first
instance? Does he have any responsibility to notify Rocky Mountain Power, or a third
party, that he feels like a filing with the recorder's office should be responded to or that
he should police those issues?
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MR. WILLIAMS: That's the practice of the assessor's office and has been for a number
of years. When there is a question as to ownership -THE COURT: Again, it might be a practice, but is there any legal or statutory authority
that he do that?
MR. WILLIAMS: There is no authority to prohibit him from doing it.
THE COURT: And in fact he holds himself out to a lawsuit such as this if he's incorrect
in his legal assessment of the state of affairs, correct?
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, correct. As we now know. 2
See Appendix, Exhibit J, p.p. 15-16; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 194.
This action is not premised on the outcome of the litigation between the Plaintiff and the
Assessor. (although the Plaintiff was successful in obtaining the relief he sought when the
Assessor retracted his slanderous statement).

Rather, this action is a challenge to an insurance

regime that thwarts the legislative effort to get local government to stay within the law and not
embark on the kind of rogue efforts that spawned the litigation between this Plaintiff and the
Assessor. Similarly what happened at the mediation is relevant only for the fact that it illustrates
an evil that needs to be eradicated. The purpose ofl.C. § 12-117 is to take away the incentive of
local government officials to act without authority and then to be stubbornly litigious when their

2 MR. ATKIN: The other position that the assessor takes that causes me and my clients grave concern is that the assessor takes the position that
what he did in this case was a discretionary function because there's nothing in the statute that prohibits him from doing the things that he did.
That is not my understanding of what a discretionary function for a government official is.
Discretionary function doesn't mean that because the statute doesn't prohibit the government official from doing something therefore he's free to
do it. My understanding of a discretionary function is the way it's defined in the tort claims act, a discretionary function is something for which
the government actor is shielded because he is performing a duty that was properly delegated to him under statute or regulation.
THE COURT: And in fact that's how governmental entities work, correct?
MR. ATKIN: That's correct.
THE COURT: They have no authority to act unless there is statutory authority for them to so act, cmTcct'?
Sec Appendix, Exhibit K. p.p. 3-4; Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 194
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conduct is called into question. What happened to the W estovers before the mediation is the
basis for this action. It is a textbook example of what happens when an insurance regime such
as ICRMP takes action to thwart the legislative intent that the consequences of unfounded and
stubborn conduct be felt in their local operating budget. A local government official is less
likely to ignore the plea of his constituent to correct a wrongful interference with a business
transaction if he knows he will feel it locally if he persists in his stubborn refusal. He is less
likely to defend arbitrary conduct "because there is no statute that prohibits his conduct" if he
knows that taking that kind of position in court is likely to ding his local operating budget. In
short, the stubborn refusal of the Assessor to correct the false statement he made to the power
company in a letter he had no business writing would be far less likely to have occurred if the
Assessor had not had insurance coverage that would pay the fees incurred by his constituents in
getting him to get off his stubborn refusal to simply correct his wrongs.

If full and complete responses to the discovery that the Plaintiff has propounded show
that the indemnification provided by ICRMP will cover awards made to citizens who meet
stubborn litigiousness from their local government officials who have acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or in law, then this action is proper and summary judgment will need to be granted
to the Plaintiff.
The Assessor, without any statutory or other authority to do so, wrote a letter to the
Westovers' Grantee, the power company, telling it that the Westovers were not the owners of the
property over which they had granted a power easement. That ultra vires act threatened to
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disrupt the Westovers' contract and power to their facility. This conduct was without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
The Westovers reached out to the Assessor, several times personally, several times
through their lawyer, and finally through a formal demand letter, asking the Assessor to correct
the error he had made through the ultra vires letter to the power company. Their pleas went
unheeded. This conduct was without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Seeing no alternative, the Westovers brought legal action against the Assessor to have the
court order him through a writ of mandamus to retract his statement to the power company that
the Westovers did not own the property.
Rather than simply retract the false statement in a letter he had no business writing, the
Assessor filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the W estovers did not have standing to seek
legal help to get the ultra vires letter retracted. That conduct was without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
Ultimately, the Assessor did issue the retraction letter telling the power company that the
W estovers did in fact own the property over which they had conveyed the easement. But that
retraction letter came after months of unnecessary delay, and thousands of dollars in attorney
fees. Since issuing the retraction letter, the Assessor has continued in his stubborn position that
he will do it again. He told this Court that sending out this kind ofletter questioning the
ownership of property is commonly done throughout the state and he plans to continue doing it.
COURT: Would you say this is a practice throughout the state?
RESPONDENTS' COUNSEL: Sending letters in general is a practice.
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Supreme Court Audio Transcript #44046 held February 17, 2017 at 13:31; See Appendix,
Exhibit H.
At no time was the Assessor able to articulate any reasonable basis in fact or law for his
issuance of the letter to the power company, and more importantly for his reluctance to simply
correct the error at the request of the Westovers until after they had spent months worrying about
their ability to continue their business and thousands of dollars in attorney fees. That prolonged
conduct was "without a reasonable basis in fact or law. "
I.C. § 12-117 requires that where a political subdivision of the State in litigation with a
private citizen has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the court shall award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The legislature went further, requiring that the brunt of
the attorney fee award be felt by the political subdivision and not be passed off. I.C. § 12-117 (3)
specifically states that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political subdivision
pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of the state
agency or political subdivision."
If ICRMP offers insurance to political subdivisions against attorney fees awards under

I.C. § 12-117(3), it negates the effect of that section and the legislative intent to bring rationality
into the actions of local government through the threat that, if they lose, and if they are found to
have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law they will have to pay an attorney fee award
out of their regular operating budget.
Throughout this ordeal, the Westovers could never understand why the Assessor ignored
their pleas, spent thousands of dollars on litigation defending conduct for which there is no
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statutory authority. Why did he not simply issue the retraction letter which he finally issued
months and thousands of dollars later. At the mediation they learned the reason. The reason was
ICRMP. By illegally insuring against the eventuality of an attorney fee award that needed to be
felt in the local operating budget, ICRMP had removed both the incentive and the power of the
Assessor to act reasonably.
Obviously the legislature, in enacting LC. § 12-117(3) was not looking for a new way for
litigants to get money from local governments. Rather they had a loftier goal in mind. That of
promoting rational and legal conduct on the part of local government. That is what the
Westovers were deprived of in this case. True, they hope one day to be compensated for the
wringer the Assessor ran them through, but whether they ever prevail on that goal, they have
been damaged by having to deal with a local government official who would not, or because of
his contract with ICRMP could not act rationally and legally in the way that he conducted the
conduct which injured the Westovers in the first place and then the litigation with the Westovers.
At this point, because ICRMP refused to respond to discovery this Court must assume
that the facts after discovery will show that ICRMP agreed to indemnify the Assessor if an award
of attorney fees were assessed for violation of LC. § 12-117, or that its insurance regime has that
practical effect. ICRMP had a contractual arrangement with the Assessor that interfered with
the Assessor's handling of the litigation so that he was precluded from acting in the manner that
he felt was reasonable and legal. If discovery shows those facts to be true, which the Court must
assume because of the premature nature of the motion for summary judgment and ICRMP's
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refusal to comply with the discovery rules, then ICRMP is a pernicious organization whose
purpose is to annul the legislative pronouncement of I.C. § 12-117, and it must be stopped.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the case should be remanded for completion of discovery and
trial.
Dated this 15th day of June, 2017.

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P. C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for Plaintif}!Appellant
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Appendix

Exhibit A

51 West Oneida St.
Preston, Idaho 83263
Jase D. Cundick
Assessor

Assessor

(208) 852-1091
Fax (208) 852-1096

May 29, 2015
Rocky Mountain Power
Craig Bolton
509 So. znd E.
Preston, ID 83263

and

Val D. Westover
500 No. Main Hwy.
Clifton, ID 83228

RE: Underground Right of Way of Easement recorded on April 20, 2015
In reviewing the document referenced above, the following concems(s) have come to our attention:

• The property description included in th.e document is not owned by the Grantor.
For further clarification of the ownership of property please contact our office.
Sincerely,
,'

/

,-/t""t.'::...;..,

'

,/

(

<

<

'
,

4,,,,..,'(_-:'(-;r' ~-

/
Jase D. Cundick
Franklin County Assessor

Exhibit B

Memorandum of Real Estate Sales Contract
· Be it known that on this 151h day of November 2007, Don A. Westover and Connie V.
Westover as sellers and Val D Westover and LaRee H. Westover as buyers entered into a Real
estate sales contract providing for a warranty deed with respect to the following described tract
ofland in Franklin County Idaho:
See, Exhibit A

Recorded at the request of

\[aJ

Dated

WtSt'ov'eY

tru't1.k day of November, 2007

?"'::::=~-~

~ov~~
STATE OF Idaho

)

: ss

COUNTY OF franklin)
On this the
day of November, 2007, personally
appeared before me Don A. Westover and Connie V. Westover, .ivl'a:J.
~.talii@l' ~d:: I.•Beo J.ia.... !,(,;5toys:t:if the signers of this memorandum,

who acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

---

-···---·--·--··-·

:t,
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Exhibit A
El/2NE1/4, SW1/4NE1/4,El/2SEV4, SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST,
BOISE MERIDIAN.
NWl/4, NW1/4NE/l/4 SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE
MERIDIAN,

Nl/2NEl/4 SECTION 29, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN.
ALSO, COMMENCING AT A POINT 1320 FEET WEST AND 300.2 FEET SOUTH OF THE

NE CORNER OF SECTION 21, 1'0WNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE
MERIDIAN, THENCE RUNNING SOUTH 34 DEGREES 54 MINUTES EAST 318.5 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 67 DEGREES 58 MINUTES WEST 96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 8
DEGREES 55 MINUTES WEST 63.5 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 39 DEGREES 27 MINUTES

WEST 48.6 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 66 DEGREES 21 MINUTES WEST 57.3 FEET
THENCE NORTH 420.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
Also excepting therefrom the following tract, to-wit:
Commencing at a point 1580 feet West and 729 feet South of the NE comer of Section 21.
Township 14 South, Range 38 East, Boise Meridian, to the point beginning, thence running
South 40 degrees 50 minutes East 440 feet; thence South 65 degrees 40 minutes West 512 feet;
Thence North 20 degrees 12 minutes East 605 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning;
Also Including, all water rights appurtenant to the property including but not limited to the
following water stock, to wit: 2 3/4 shares in the Rushville irrigation company. Excepting
therefrom portions deeded for road or road purposes.
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Name of Notary Public
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0 Proved tome on the oath of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ersonally known to me

0 Proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Description of ID)

to be the person(s) whose name(s) i:s/are subscribed to the within instrument. and acknowledged that he/she/they executed It.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

(Signature of Notaq Public)

My commission expires
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Notary Seal
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oo n..t'e \/ u)esfove.r

Name of Signer(s)

0 Proved to me on the oath of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~Personally known to me

0

Proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Description of ID)

to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged that he/she/they executed it.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

(Signature of Notary Publkl

My commission expires
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Rocky Mountain Power
Craig Bolton
509 S 2m1E
Preston, ID 83263

SHAUNA

By

rm,~s.

Rl:CORDEFt
Deputy
Franklin County, Idaho

•Q

b::

Project Name:
Tract NO.:
WO#:
RW#:

UNDERGROUND RIGHT WAY OF EASEMENT

For value received, Val D. Westover ("Grantor"), hereby grants to PacifiCorp, an Oregon
Corporation, d/b/a Rocky Mountain Power its successors and assigns, ("Grantee"). An easement for a
right of way 10 feet in width and 339 feet in length, more or less, for the construction, reconstruction,
operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, enlargement, and removal of underground electric
power transmission, distribution and communication lines and all necessary or desirable accessories
and appurtenances thereto, including without limitation: wires, fibers, cables, and other conductors
and conduits therfor; and pads, transformers, switches, cabinets, and vaults on, across, or under the
surface of the real property of Grantor in Franklin County, State of Idaho more particularly described
as follows and as more particularly described and/or shown on Exhibit(s) (Insert ALL Exhibit
References i.e. A,B) attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof:
This Property description does not include a blanket easement, but does specify property upon
which this proposed easement is located: The easement is strictly limited to a 10 FT wide path from
PacifiCorp's power pole located in Hwy 01 right of way in a westerly direction 339 FT to and including
the site of the transformer that will be located on the east side of the new warehouse.
legal Description:

El/2NE1/4, SW1/4NE1/4, El/2SE1/4, SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH RANGE 38 EAST,
BOISE MERIDIAN.
NWl/4, NW1.4NE/1/4 SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN,
Nl/2NE1/4 SECTION 29, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOSIDE MERIDIAN.
ALSO, COMMENCING AT A POINT 1320 FEET WEST AND 300.2 FEET SOUHT OF THE NE CORNER
OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, THENCE RUNNING
SOUTH 34 DEGREES 54 MINUTES EAST 318.5 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 67 DEGREES 58 MINUTES
WEST 96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 8 DEGREES 55 MINUTES WEST 63.5 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 39
DEGREES 27 MINUTES WEST 48.6 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 66 DEGREES 21 MINUTES WEST 57.3
FEET THENCE NORTH 420.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
Assessor Parcel No.

844.0

264205

2 ... 't

.
Together with the right of access to the right of way from adjacent lands of Grantor for all
activities in connection with the purposes for which this easement has been granted; and together
with the present and (without payment therefor) the future right to keep the right of way clear of all
brush, trees, timber, structures, buildings, and other hazards which might endanger Grantee's
facilities or impede Grantee's activities.
At no time shall Grantor place or store any flammable material (other than agricultural crops),
or light any fires, on or within the boundaries of the right of way. Subject to the foregoing limitations,
the surface of the right of way may be used for agricultural crops and other purposes not inconsistent,
as determined by Grantee, with the purposes for which this easement has been granted.
The rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall be binding upon and shall benefit their
respective heirs, successors and assigns.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, each of the parties hereto waives any right it may have
to a trial by jury in respect of litigation directly or indirectly arising out of, under or in connection with
this agreement. Each party further waives any right to consolidate any action in which a jury trial has
been waived with any other action in which a jury trial cannot be or has not been waived.
D a t e d t h i s 1 7 d a y o f~
M ~r c·
h, 2·
01
·5
Val D. Westover
Signature,.,.....__
(Insert Grantor Name Here) GRANTOR

Laree H. Westover
(Insert Grantor Name Here) GRANTOR

Signatur

264205 3-Lf

** {CHOOSE APPROPRIATE ACKNOWLEGEMENT AND DELETE THE OTHERS)****"'

Acknowledgement by an Individual Action on His own Behalf:
STATE OF

J;:Jq;;v }

County of

fuv h"ll'g/
~

~

I

.--·

On this / ~ay of . 1'11"'~ .
, 201.z_ before me, the undersigned Notary Public in and for
said State, personally api)Wed Val D Westover (name), known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that (he/she/they)
executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the day and year in
this certificate first above written.

CHRISTY BARTHLOME
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

\

NOTARY PUBLIC FQR _

(notary signature)
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Exhibit D

ATKIN IJA W OFFICES
A PROFESS!ON1\L CORPORA I'lON
7579 ~ort:1 ·w<"stside Highway
C!itlor.. ID 83228
TFLEPHONl· (801) 533-0300
fACSl:\HLE (801 l 533-0380

e•mai:: bati<.:nrc?:itkin!awofficcs.net

June 24, 2015

Jase Cundick
Franklin County Assessor
51 West Oneida
Preston, ID 83263
Dear Mr. Cundick:
I have tried unsuccessfully to contact you by phone to attempt to resolve a very serious
issue. This firm represents Val Westover and LaRee Westover, owners of certain property in
Franklin County. The Westovers lease that property to Butterfly Express, Inc. a company that
does about $250,000 of business per month in the county and employs over 20 Franklin County
residents.
Recently, the Westovers granted a lease to the power company as part of a contract to
have power supplied to a new facility on the property. Your office mistakenly concluded that the
Westovers did not own the property and you took it upon yourself to notify the power company
that the Westovers, who had granted them the easement, did not own the property. I enclose, as
Exhibit A, the Jetter as communicated to my client by the power company.
That slander of title and your office's refusal to correct it, has now resulted in the power
company threatening to declare the contract with my clients in breach and remove their
equipment from the premises. That action will disrupt the business and result in massive and
irreparable damage to Butterfly Express and to the Westovers. Unless you and your employees
want to find yourselves embroiled in significant investigation and litigation, you need to take
steps immediately to undo the slander of ti tic that you have committed.
I attempted to get satisfaction from one of your employees. But rather than listen to me
she chose to argue the legal significance of some documents that have been filed. I sense that
your employees are not lawyers, and l am surprised thc'lt the county allows them to practice law
without a license. Let me explain to you what I explained to your employee. I would be pleased

if you are a lawyer, and in the case you <1re not I suggest that you discuss this with the county's
lawyer who no doubt will understand what I a.'11 saying, and hopefully advise you to do what I
am asking in order to avoid serious legal proceedmgs.
Seven years ago, Val and LaRee Westover bought the property in question under a real
estate contract from Val's mother and father, Connie and Don Westover. A memorandum of that
agreement was filed with the county recorder putting all the world on notice that Val and LaRee
Westover were the owners of the property. I enclose as exhibit B, a copy of that recorded
memorandum.
After that memorandum was recorded, the property did not belong to Don or Connie
Westover, and anything filed by either of them except the Warranty Deed called for in their
contract with Val and LaRee Westover (which we have now filed) simply has n0 legal effect. I
was told that Don Westover had attempted to convey the property to a Trust. Not only did your
office reject that filing, but even if it had been properly filed, it could not have affected title to
the property because by the time of that filing Don and Connie Westover had sold the property to
Val and LaRee Westover under the real estate contract mentioned above. It was next argued that
there were discrepancies in the legal descriptions of the properties that Don and Connie
conveyed to Val and LaRee Westover. We have attempted to correct any scrivener's errors in
the legal descriptions, but none of those discrepancies affects the easement granted to the power
company. There simply is no legal basis for the claim you made to the power company that Val
and LaRee Westover did not own the property when they granted the easement to the power
company.
If you want to avoid serious legal entanglements you must do two things immediately.
First, you need to write to the power company and retract your slander of title and acknowledge
to them that Val and LaRee Westover are the legal owners of the property and the prior Jetter you
sent them was the result of a negligent and/or incompetent examination of the real estate records
performed by your office. Second, you need to write to Val and LaRee Westover and similarly
point out that the letter to the power company was the result of negligent and/or incompetent
examination or interpretation of the real e:;tatc re~,~rds on your part.

l have a client that is very frustrated and angry at what has occurred. He feels that in this
county, where all the parties are known well by each other, that before you would take action
that threatened a $250,000 per month business, you could pick up the phone to make sure that
you are correct before slandering someone's title. If you have not taken both steps outlined
above by June 29, 2015, I have betn instructed t0 take whatever action that is necessary to
protect the interests of the Westovtrs and Butterfly Express, Inc.

Please feel free to call me if you have any questions.
Sincerely,

Blake S. Atkin

Exhibit A

Jase D. Cundick
Assessor

Assessor

51 West Oneida St
Preston, Idaho 83263
(208) 852-1091
Fax (208) 852-1096

May 29, 2015
Rocky Mountain Power
Craig Bolton
509 So. 2nd E.
Preston, ID 83263

and

Val D. Westover
500 No. Main Hwy.
Clifton, ID 83228

RE: Underground Right of Way of Easement recorded on April 20, 2015
In reviewing the document referenced above, the following concems(s) have come to our attention:
• The property description included in the document is not owned by the Granter.
For further clarification of the ownership of property please contact our office.

Sincerely,

Jase D. Cundick
Franklin County Assessor

Exhibit B
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Memorandum of Real Estate Sales Contract
·· Be it known that on this 1511t day of November 2007, Don A Westover and Connie V.
Westover as sellers and Val D Westover and LaRee H. Westover as buyers entered into a Real
estate sales contract providing for a warranty deed with respect to the following described tract
ofland in Franklin County Idaho:
See, Exhibit A

Recorded at the request of

'£a.,\

Dated

WlS-\"'o~

thit2/z day of November, 2007

,,a,, ~---

. 2007 p.m.12-:1-cJ ~II
_a.rn. NOV,·26

v.

~

:.

LIOTT LARSE
FRANKL!

Ml:'t=

Don A. Westover
I

RECORDER

s

~p~
OUNTY. IDAHO

Q. ~

~

U ,

v..J~

~~

Connie~

~Westover

STATE OF Idaho

/.

)

: ss

COUNTY OF Franklin)

On this the
day of November, 2007, personally
~Ju),
appeared before me Don A. Westover and Connie V. Westover, -¥a.J. t,
W-i.tOT,t@r Mid::- La.Pee :a....__ ~;stoye:r;,. the signers of this memorandum,
who acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

Notary Public

---------···-----····-----··-··-·---······--··••.- ...... .

Exhibit A
El/2NEl/4, SWI/4NEl/4,El/2SEl/4, SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST,
BOISE MERIDIAN.
NWl/4, NWI/4NE/l/4 SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE
MERIDIAN,
Nl/2NEl/4 SECTION 29, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN.
ALSO, COMMENCING AT A POINT 1320 FEET WEST AND 300.2 FEET SOUTH OF THE
NE CORNER OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 14 SOUTH, RANGE 38 EAST, BOISE
MERIDIAN, THENCE RUNNING SOUTH 34 DEGREES 54 MINUTES EAST 318.5 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 67 DEGREES 58 MINUTES WEST 96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 8
DEGREES 55 MINUTES WEST 63.5 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 39 DEGREES 27 MINUTES
WEST 48.6 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 66 DEGREES 21 MINUTES WEST 57.3 FEET
THENCE NORTH 420.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
Also excepting therefrom the following tract, to-wit:
Commencing at a point 1580 feet West and 729 feet South of the NE comer of Section 21,
Township 14 South, Range 38 East, Boise Meridian, to the point beginning, thence running
South 40 degrees 50 minutes East 440 feet; thence South 65 degrees 40 minutes West 512 feet;
Thence North 20 degrees 12 minutes East 605 feet, more or less, to the point of beginning;
Also Including, all water rights appurtenant to the property including but not limited to the
following water stock, to wit: 2 3/4 shares in the Rushville irrigation company. Excepting
therefrom portions deeded for road or road purposes.
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Acknowledgment by Individual

~tare o 1 d

On this

[Ur)o

l]

day of

Count~ .

I

11 / .

_I_(@ ~ I ()

NlN embr.c

.20 il. before me.

~Co~·~l~l_e~en.____..,_..f~i_r-lli~Name of Notary Public

the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared
1

Dro

A LLJe•. ~over

Name of Slgner(s)

0 Proved tome on the oath of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ersonally known to me

0 Proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ (Description of 10)

to be the person(s) whose narne{s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument. and acknowledged that he/she/they executed it.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

(Signature of Notary Publk)

My commission expires
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Notary Seal
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Acknowledgment by Individual
J

State of

On this

'k··A

County of

:Cat11\o
l1

dayof

I

tClkfl ~·-/,h

\J 0\Jet:Dbe..c

Coll~

.20£[].beforeme.

Name of Notary Public

the undecgned Notary Public, personally appeared

,

·/oon.,,·e.

\I ulesfuvu

Name of Signer(s)

0

Proved to me on the oath of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Qli'Personally known to me

0

Proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Description of ID)

to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged that he/she/they executed it.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

(Signature of Notary Public)

My commission expires

I
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Though the information In this section ls not required by Jaw. it may prevent fraudulent removal and reattachment of this form to
another document and could prove valuable to persons relying on the document.
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FILED IN CHAMBERS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VAL D. WESTOVER,
Plaintiff,

vs

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK IYIANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (ICRMP)
Defendant.

________________

)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2016-195

)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON ICRMP'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's, Idaho Counties Risk Management
Program ("ICRMP"), Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ"). 1 In conjunction with a Motion to
Compel, the Plaintiff, Val D. Westover ("Westover"), filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Compel and in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opposition Meroorandum").2

11CRMP's MSJ was supported by a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Supporting
Memorandum"), the Affidavit of Phillip J. Collaer in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Collaer Affidavit"), and the
Affidavit of Jeff Boice in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Boice Affidavit'').
2 At this point the Court must depart and address other procedural issues that came up in the context of this summary judgment
proceeding. Westover did not file any affidavits or other evidence in support of his Opposition Memorandum. Instead, Westover
filed a separate Motion to Compel. While Westover obtaim:d a Stipulation with counsel for JCRl\1P to have his Motion to
Compel heard on shortened notice (See Stipulation filed on September 19, 19, 2016), his Motion to Compel was not actually filed
until after the hearing on ICRMP's MSJ. See Minute Entry and Order entered on October 1, 2016. Because the Court granted
ICRMP's MSJ from the bench, the Court did not take up Westover's Motion to Compel despite the parties' Stipulation. Toe
Court would also note that as pan of the proceedings on summary judgment and presumably Westover's Motion to Compel,
Westover made reference to Rule 56(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") arguing that said Ruic "makes it clear
that a party is entitled to discovery before bcing required to respond to a motion for summary judgment" See Opposition
Memorandum, p. 2. While I.R.C.P. 56(d) does provide a mechanism upon which a non-moving party faced with summary
judgment may obtain relief from the pending summary judgment, Westover has completely failed to comply with the
requirements ofl.R.C.P. 56(d). This Rule provides as follows:
Jf a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential
to justify its opposition, the court may:
(\) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take: discovery; or
(3) issue any other appropriate order.
Westover has wholly failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 56(d). He did not file a motion requesting any relief allowed pursuant to.
I.R.C.P. 56(d) subparagraphs (I) through (3). He did not file an affidavit or declaration setting forth a "specified reason" for any
of the relief allowed pursuant to l.R.C.P. 56(d)(I), (2) or (3). The burden of the moving party associated with a request made
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ICRMP filed a Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply

Memorandum"). ICRMP's MSJ was argued before the Court and at the conclusion of the
parties' argument, the Court

GRANTED ICRMP's MSJ. However, the Court advised the

parties that it would issue a written Memorandum Decision and Order with respect to its order
granting summary judgment.

BACKGROUND
The genesis of the present controversy arises out of civil litigation between Westover and
Jase Cundick, the Franklin County Assessor.

See Westover v. Cundick, Franklin County

Assessor, Franklin County Case No. CV-2015-312 ("Westover v. Cundick''). In said litigation,
Westover requested that this Court enter a Writ of Mandamus and/or a Writ of Prohibition in his
favor. 3 The Court, in Westover v. Cundick, denied Westover's requested relief. See Westover v.

Cundick, Final Judgment filed stamped February 17, 2016 and Minute Entry and Order file
stamped February 24, 2016.4 During the course of the litigation in Westover v. Cundick, the

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d)(l) (formerly numbered as l.R.C.P. 56(f)) was recently addressed in Fagen, Inc. v. Lava Beds Wind

Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628, 364 P_Jd 1193 (2016) (:'Fagen"). In Fagen, the Idaho Supreme Court noted as follows:
Rule 56(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial court to continue the hearing on a motion for
summary judgment if "it appear[s) from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition." "The rule clearly
contemplates that such a motion must be supported with an affidavit stating the reasons why the continuance
is necessary." Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Hymas, 157 Idaho 632, 638, 339 P.3d 357, 363 (2014). The party
seeking a continuance "has the burden of setting out 'what further discovery would reveal that is essential to
justify their opposition,' making clear 'what information is sought and how it would preclude summary
judgment."' Jenkins 'V. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380, 386 (2005). In ruling on a
motion for a continuance under Rule 56(f), the trial court can consider "the moving party's previous lack of
diligence in pursing discovery." Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 106, 294
P.3d I JI, 1118 (2013).
Id. at 632,364 P.3d at 1197. Therefore, the Court denied I.RC.P. 56(d) relief, to the extent that Westover was requesting a
continuance pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(d)(J). See Minute Entry and Order entered on October 1, 2016.
JSpecifically, Westover requested that the Court issue a Writ of Mandate "ordering Jase Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, to
retract his slander of title." See Westover v. Cundick, Complaint, p. 5. Westover also requested that the Court issue a Writ of
Prohibition "prohibiting Jase Cundick, Franklin County Assessor, from exceeding his authority in making property ownership
determinations for purposes beyond those required for taxes, and from communicating those determinations to third parties-" Jd.
Interestingly, the third cause of action asserted by Westover was one for Slander of Title_ This is likely the cause of action wh.ich
invoked a duty to defend under ICRMP's insurance contract with Frank.Jin County, which defense: and associated involvement in
the litigation provides the basis for Westover's complaints in the present litigation. This cause of action was ultimately dismissed
by Westover at the time of oral argument on Cundick's Motion to Dismiss.
"Westover perfected an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court conceming this detenninarion of the Court. This matter is presently
pending before the Idaho Supreme Court.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORD:ER ON ICRMP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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FAX No.

parties patticipated in mediation. Westover alleges that the "focus of mediation was how much
the county would pay in attorney fees to the Plaintiff because the county assessor had retracted
its slanderous letter before mediation." Complaint, ~ 5. 5

Westover alleges that at mediation,

Cundick "announced ... that he could not offer anything in way of settlement of Plaintiff's
claims for attorney fees because he had no authority from ICRMP to offer anything in
settlement." Complaint, ~ 6.

Westover alleges further, that he was "informed that ICRMP

controlled the litigation, provided lawyers who were defending [Cundick], would ultimately be
responsible to pay any judgment Plaintiff might obtain against the county assessor for attorney
fees, and asserted the right to control the negotiations at the mediation." Complaint~ 7.
Based upon the foregoing, Westover filed his Complaint against ICRMP seeking a
declaration of rights, specifically requesting that the Court declare "ICRMP [to be] an illegal
entity, not authorized by Idaho Law" and also a declaration that "ICRMP in controlling litigation
between citizens and their local government by providing the defense and indemnifying for
attorney fees undermines principles of good governance as adopted by the legislature in Idaho
Code Section 12-117(3) and is therefore illegal." See Complaint, Prayer for Relief,

,r,r 1 and 2.

ICRMP filed its Answer followed sho1tly by the present MSJ.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party is entitled to summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving pruty is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Idaho Rules of Civil

1The

Court cannot speak to issue of what the primary focus of the mediation was. However, the Court's intention with respect to
ordering mediation in this matter was directed at resolving, through the mediation process, Westover's requests for Writ's of
Mandamus and ProhibiLion and his Slander of Title claim. See Westover v. Cundick, Minute Entry and Order file stamped
December 7, 2015. Ultimately, this mediation proved to be unsuccessful resulting in the Court having to rule on Cundick's
Motion to Dismiss. See Westover v. Cundick, Final Judgment filed stamped February 17, 2016 and Minute Entry and
Order file stamped Febmary 24, 2016.
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Procedure 56(c); Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't ofAdmin., 159 Idaho 813, 367 P.3d 208,
223 (2016).
The standards applicable to summary judgment require the courts to liberally construe the

facts in the record in favor of the non-moving party and to draw all reasonable inferences from
the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Hilliard v. Murphy Land Co., LLC, 158 Idaho 737,
744, 351 P.3d 1195, 1202 (2015), reh'g denied (July 20, 2015). If the record contains conflicting
inferences or reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be
de1ried. Edged In Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 180, 321 P.3d 726, 730
(2014). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. UnifundCCR, UCv. Lowe, 159 Idaho 750, 367P.3d 145,149 (2016)
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all
times with the party moving for summary judgment. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho
799, 805, 353 P.3d 420, 426 (2015).

In order to meet its burden, the moving party must

challenge in its motion and establish through evidence the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact on an element of the non-moving party's case.

If the moving party fails to

challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the burden does not shift to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party is not
required to respond with supporting evidence. Meikle v. Watson, 138 Idaho 680, 683, 69 P.3d
100, 103 (2003). However, if the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's
case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create

a

genuine issue of fact. Id.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party bearing the burden of proof fails

l\1EMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON ICRMP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 4
235 of 272

NOV/14/2016/MON 02:47 PM

FAX No.

P. 006/012

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case. T.JT., Inc. v. Mori, 152 Idaho l, 4,266 P.3d 476,479 (2011).
Toe party opposing the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided mthis rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial."

Holdaway v. Broulim's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 610, 349 P.3d 1197, 1201

(2015), reh'g denied (June 22, 2015).

The non-moving party's case must be anchored in

something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue of fact. Am. Bank v. Wadsworth Golf Const. Co. of the Sw., 155 Idaho 186, 190,
307 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2013). If the non-moving party does not come forward as provided in the
rule, then summary judgment should be entered against that party. Rod.y Mountain Power v.

Jensen, 154 Idaho 549,554,300 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2012).
All doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied if
the evidence is such that one may draw conflicting inferences, and if reasonable people might
reach different conclusions. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,411, 179 P.3d
1064, 1066-67 (2008).
Toe burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact rests at all times
upon the moving party. Silicon Int'l Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 53 8, 550, 314 P .3d
593, 605 (2013). However, once the absence of sufficient evidence on an element has been
shown, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

Holdaway v. Broulirn's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 610-11, 349 P.3d 1197, 1201-02 (2015),
reh'g denied (June 22, 2015).
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DISCUSSION
ICRMP seeks summary judgment with respect to Westover's declaratory judgment
action, arguing "that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that [ICRMP] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

MSJ, p. l.

Specifically, ICRMP asserts: (1) that

Westover "lacks standing to seek declaratory relief against ICRMP" (See Supporting
Memorandum, pp. 3-6); and (2) that Idaho Code ("I.C.") § 12-117 does "not prevent Franklin
County from Purchasing Casualty Insurance" (See Supporting Memorandum, pp. 6-9).

A. JCRMP's Assertion of Lack of Standing
The Court will first address ICRMP's assertion that Westover lacks standing to pursue
this declaratory judgment action. Westover's claim is for a declaration declaring that ICRMP is
an "illegal entity" and that ICRMP's conduct in providing Cundick a defense in Westover v.

Cundick, directing the litigation and indemnifying Cundick for any award of attorney fees was
also illegal.
Title 10 of the Idaho Code, Chapter 12, addresses declaratory judgments in Idaho.
Specifically, LC. § 10-1201 provides as follows:
Courts of record within therr respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree js prayed for. The declaration may be either
affmnative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
I.C. § 10-1202 provides that:

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writmgs
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
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[Bold Emphasis Added by Court].
ICRMP argues that what is commonly referred to as the "direct action rule" prohibits
Westover from pursuing this action directly against ICRMP.

One of Idaho's earlier

pronouncements articulating the "direct action rule" is contained in Pocatello Indus. Park Co. v.

Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980) ("Pocatello Indus. Par!f'). In Pocatello
Indus. Park, the Idaho Supreme Court states as follows:
It is well established that absent a contractual or statutory provision authorizing
the action, an insurance caiTier cannot be sued directly and cannot be joined as a
party defendant.

Id. at p. 791, 621 P.2d at 407. Certainly, there is no contractual basis authorizing the present
In fact, there is no contractual relationship between Westover and ICRMP, nor has

action.

Westover pointed the Court to any provision of ICRMP's contract of insurance with Franklin
County that would afford a third party, such as Westover, to bring a direct action against
ICRMP.
Therefore, the only basis upon which an argument may be asserted that Westover may
pursue bis "direct action" against ICRMP would be a "statutory provision authorizing the
action". One can certainly argue that LC. § 10-1202 is a "statutory provision authorizing such an
action. The prefatory phrase of J.C. § 10-1202 is "any interested person", without any limiting
language in the statute; this phrase can certainly be interpreted broadly enongh to include
Westover under the facts of this case. Certainly utilizing a broad definition of "any interested
person", Westover is interested in the insurance relationship between ICRMP and Franklin
County to the extent outlined in his Complaint.
However, Idaho case law has been unwilling to apply such a broad definition to the
phrase contained in I.C. § 10-1202, "any interested person." This Comt concludes that Brooksby
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v. Geico Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546,286 P.3d 182 (2012) ("Brooksby") and its ruling relating to the
application of the language in LC. § 10-1202 is dispositive of the issue before this Court on

summary judgment.
Brooksby involved a case where Christina Brooksby ("Christina") was injured in a one
car motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle operated by her father, Craig Brooksby
("Craig'}

Christina demanded payment from Craig's liablility insurer, GEICO General

Insurance Company ("GEICO"). GEICO rejected Christina's claim and Christina filed a
declaratory judgment action against GEICO requesting a declaration of coverage under Craig's
insurance policy with GEICO.

Id. at p. 547, 286 P.3d 183.

The trial court "dismissed

Christina's Complaint for lack of standing." 6
Christina appealed the detennination of the trial court dismissing her complaint. The trial
court's dismissal was affim1ed by the Idaho Supreme Court.

In affirming the trial court's

dismissal, the Supreme Comt restated the basis for the "direct action rule" stating as follows:
The basis for this [the direct action] rule is that an insurance policy is "a matter of
contract between the insurer and the insured," and a third party "allegedly injured
by the insured is not a party to the insurance contract and has no rights under it.''
Hartman, 141 Idaho at 199, 108 P.3d at 346

Id. at 548,286 P.3d, at 184. The Supreme Court continued its holding by stating as follows:

It makes no difference that Brooksby seeks declaratory relief as opposed to
money damages. The requirement that a party have standing is equally applicable

in both types of actions. See Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State ex. rel. Batt, 128
Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996) ("[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act
does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the action in the
first instance."); State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 597, 809 P.2d 455,458 (1991)
("[A] declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or
Court would note that Brooks by 's posture at the time of dismissal was different than the case at bar. In Brooksby, the issue
before the trial court was a request for dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The present motion is one for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56. However, this distinction is without
substance. It has long been the rule in Idaho that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) will be treated as a summary judgment motion. See Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 134,
139 P.3d 732, 736. That is essentially what is before the Court in the present motion, a motion to dismiss with supporting
affidavits filed !CR.MP.
1Thc

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON JCRMP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 8
239 of 272

NOV/14/2016/MON 02:48 PM

FAX No.

P.010/012

justiciable controversy exists.'> (quoting Harris v. Cassia Cnty., 106 Idaho 513,
516, 681 P.2d 988,991 (1984))).
Moreover, Brooksby's position is contradicted by the plain language of Idaho's
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act:
Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a ...
contract ... may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the ... contract ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other
legal relations thereunder.
I. C. § 10-1202 (emphasis added). In other words, the Act does not create any new
rights, statuses, or legal relations. It applies only where such rights, statuses, or
legal relations already exist. At this juncture, Brooksby simply has no right,
status, or legal relationship vis-a-vis GEICO that could form the basis of a
declaratory judgment action. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Dist. Court for Fourth
Judicial Dist., 862 P.2d 944, 948 (Colo.1993) (declaratory judgment would not
affect injured third party's then-existing or reasonably foreseeable rights, as she
might fail to establish alleged tortfeasor's liability); Knittle v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., 112 Nev. 8, 908 P .2d 724, 726 (1996).

Id at 548-49, 286 P.3d at 184-85. As was the case in Brooksby, outside of Westover's attempt
to obtain standing pursuant to Idaho's Declaratory Judgment statutes, Westover has no
contractual, tortious or other legal basis or standing to sue !CR.MP. Without some independent
"actual or justiciable controversy" between ICRMP and Westover, Idaho's Declaratory
Judgment Act "does not create any new rights, statuses or legal relations." Id. Rather, it only
provides a forum for declaration in a context "where such rights, statuses, or legal relations
already exist." Id.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Westover lacks standing to pursue a
declaratory judgment action against ICRMP. As a result, the Court will GRANT ICRMP's

MSJ. 7

7

ICRJv[p also seeks summary judgment on the alternative ground that I.C. § 12-117 does not prevent Franklin
County from purchasing casualty insurance. The Court need not address this alternative ground for summary
judgment based upon its conclusion that Westover lacks standing. However, the Court agrees with ICRMP's
analysis of the summary judgment record as it relates to ICRMP's aJternative basis for summary judgment. Had the
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court GRANTS ICR1v1P's MSJ having concluded, based
upon the record before the Court on summary judgment, that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that ICRMP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon Westover's
lack of standing to pursue his Complaint requesting declaratory relief. The Court will enter a
separate fmaljudgment in this matter, dismissing Westover's Complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 14th day ofNovember, 2016.

...

~/!
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the_ day of November, 2016, she caused a txue and
correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in
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Blake S. Atkin
Counsel for Plaintiff

Facsimile: (801) 533-0380

Phillip J. Collaer

facsimile: (208) 344-5510

Counsel for Defendnat

SHAUNA T. GEDDES, Clerk
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Court not granted sum.ma1y judgment on tb.e standing issue, it would also have granted summary judgment on the
alternative ground asserted by ICRMP.
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ATKIN LAW OFFICES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, ID 83228
TELEPHONE (801) 533-0300
FACSIMILE (801) 533-0380
e-mail: batkin@atkinlawoffices.net

August 15, 2016

Phillip J. Collaer
Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP
C.W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Re: Westover v. ICRMP case no. CV-2016-195
Responses to discovery requests
Dear Mr. Collaer:
I am writing this letter in order to try to avoid the cost of a motion to compel responses to
our discovery requests served on you on June 24, 2016. You served responses to our requests
for admission, but have not responded to our interrogatories nor our document requests. I have
received your motion for protective order and take it from that filing that you do not intend to
respond to our other discovery requests until compelled to do so by the Court. Hence this letter.
I do not agree with your premise that our discovery is irrelevant since local governments
are statutorily entitled to buy insurance that will reimburse tort claimants. Further, I do not think
that filing a motion for protective order is an appropriate method to object to discovery that you
consider to be irrelevant.

The ultimate issues in this case should not be litigated in a discovery

dispute, but would appear to me to be better relegated to a summary judgment motion after
proper discovery responses have fleshed out the issues factually.
On the issue of a local government's legal right to purchase insurance, I believe you miss
the point. As I am sure you are aware, the purpose of tort law, and in particular the tort claims
act, is to provide for compensation for injured persons. In that context, insurance is not only
permissible, but no doubt desirable from the tort victim's standpoint because it provides a ready
fund for compensation.

On the other hand, the purpose of Idaho Code 12-117(3) to achieve

some modicum of local responsibility for unreasonable conduct will be greatly undermined if
local government officials are able to purchase insurance coverage that prevents attorney fee

awards for violating the legal rights of citizens without a reasonable basis in fact or law from
coming from the regular operating budget of that government.
That is the issue we are raising in this lawsuit. We want to know whether your insurance
to local government officials is having the effect of thwarting the legislative purpose in the
enactment of Idaho Code Section 12-117 by shifting the burden of paying attorney fees awarded
for government action that is without a basis in fact or law from the offending party's operating
budget to your insurance pool. Our discovery requests were specifically tailored to find the
answer to that question. Your obfuscation in response to our requests for admission and your
refusal to respond to the interrogatories and document requests has made it impossible for us to
answer this rather straightforward question.
Our rules of civil procedure define the scope of discovery. Rule 26(b )(1 )(A) provides the
simple formula:
General Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.
Tellingly, the rule continues: "Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Issues relating to what might be admissible at trial are not litigated at the discovery stage. Mr.
Westover's discovery was specifically directed to the question of whether ICRMP policies
interfere with the legislative directive found in Idaho Code section 12-117 designed to bring
accountability to local government by making them feel the consequence of their conduct in their
operating budget. Mr. Westover's discovery is aimed precisely at that pivotal point and is highly
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Interrogatory No. 1 is a typical request to provide a factual basis for failing to admit
critical issues in the case. Such interrogatories not only help frame the issues that might be
ultimately tried, but provide a buffer against the type of evasive answers to requests for
admission that were submitted in this case. ICRMP's answers to those requests for admission
are a model of obfuscation whenever the request neared the critical issues in this case.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #1: Admit that you have the duty and the right to

defend your members against lawsuits brought against them by citizens subject to their
jurisdiction.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it is contractually obligated to provide a defense to
its insureds when they are sued for claims that are potentially entitled to coverage under the
ICRMP insurance policy. ICRMP denies the remainder of Request No. 1.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #2: Admit that you have the right to control the

litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it has a contractual right to make strategic decisions
concerning litigation involving claims that are entitled to coverage under the ICRMP policy.
Defendant denies the remainder of Request No. 2.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #3: Admit that you have the right to control settlement

and mediation of litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 2, above.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #7: Admit that on July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed an

action against the Franklin County Assessor in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Case No.
CV-2015-312. ("The Assessor Lawsuit")
RESPONSE: It is admitted that there exists a case styled Westover v. Cundick, et al,

Case No. CV-2015-312 in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Franklin County, Idaho.
When specifically asked requests for admission on the ultimate issues in this lawsuit
(which is specifically allowed under rule 30, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure),
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #4: Admit that you have the duty to pay any expenses

awarded against your members in lawsuits tendered to you by your members, including actions
covered by Idaho Code Section 12-117.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #11: Admit that you refused to authorize the Franklin

County Assessor to pay any money in settlement of the Assessor Lawsuit during that mediation.
RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is

ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
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those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a

legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #14: Admit that any payment that you make toward

attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will be paid from
funds you collect and pool from all your members.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,

and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #15: Admit that any payment that you make toward

attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will not be paid from
funds in the regular operating budget of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,

and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
ICRMP denied the requests, hence the need for a response to the first interrogatory
spelling out the factual basis for denial.
Similarly, in response to a requests about the jurisdictional basis for this lawsuit, Plaintiff
was given evasive answers:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #6: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is a

political subdivision.
RESPONSE: Denied as phrased.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #8: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is

and was at the time the Assessor Lawsuit was filed one of your members.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request as phrased is a compound request. It is admitted

only that Franklin County was an insured ofICRMP. The remainder of the request is denied.
Obviously, the contract by which ICRMP was obligated to provide a defense to the
lawsuit brought by Mr. Westover against the Assessor (Interrogatory No. 2), may shed light on
whether the insurance practices of ICRMP undermine the legislative purposes of Idaho Code
section 12-117. If that contract provides that ICRMP will pay a judgment for attorney fees
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despite a ruling by the Court that the assessor acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law,"
the purposes ofldaho Code section 12-117 will be thwarted. Curiously, in responses to request
for admission No. 13, ICRMP instead of giving a forthright admission or denial as required by
the rules, instead obfuscated by reference to this contract that it now refuses to produce!

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is
ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a
legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.
Interrogatory No. 3 is directly to the point: "Please identify the source of any payments
that have been made, or that will be made or for which there is an obligation to be made to
reimburse attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit in the event that a court orders
the Franklin County Assessor to pay attorney fees in connection with that lawsuit." Any
payment of attorney fees to the plaintiff in the Assessor lawsuit will be on the basis that the
Assessor's position in that lawsuit was "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The
legislature specifically required that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political
subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of
the state agency or political subdivision." Idaho Code Section 12-117 (3). Obviously, ifICRMP
were obligated to pay those fees and is the source of those payments the legislative purpose in
making sure that irresponsible actions by local government officials is felt at the local level so as
to be a deterrent to future local government irresponsibility will be undermined.
The remaining three interrogatories (mistakenly all numbered No. 3) simply ask for the
identifying information relating to witnesses, expert witnesses, and persons with knowledge of
the facts.

Rule 26 specifically makes that information discoverable. Rule 26(b )( 1)(A). It is

difficult to imagine a proper objection to such information.
Mr. Westover's document requests were similarly all seeking discoverable evidence and
were specifically aimed at facts relevant to the pivotal issue in this case of whether a local
government official has purchased insurance that has the potential of thwarting the goal of Idaho
Code section 12-117 to bring accountability to local government conduct by requiring them to
pay attorney fees incurred by their constituents fighting battles that should never have been
5
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fought.
I hope that as you consider the points I have raised in this letter, you will decide to
provide us with the evidence we have sought in our discovery requests. If you continue to assert
that you have no duty to do so, please advise me of the reasonable basis for your refusal to
provide what seems to me to be highly relevant information.
Sincerely,

Blake S. Atkin
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 44046

VAL D. WESTOVER and LAREE H.
WESTOVER,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
)
)
)
v.
)
JASE D. CUNDICK, in his individual
)
capacity and in his official capacity as
)
Franklin County Assessor, and JOHN DOES )
1 and 2,
)
)
____
D_e_fe_n_d_a_n_t_s_-R_e_s~p_o_n_d_e_n_ts_._ _ _ _ _ _)

Boise, February 2017 Term
2017 Opinion No. 33
Filed: April 14, 2017
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Franklin County. Hon. Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Atkin Law Offices, P.C., Clifton, for appellants. Blake S. Atkin argued.
Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, for respondents. Tyler D. Williams argued.

HORTON, Justice.
Val and LaRee Westover appeal from the district court's judgment and denial of their
request for writs of mandate and prohibition against Franklin County Assessor Jase Cundick. The
dispute arose when the W estovers granted an easement to Rocky Mountain Power on property
owned by the Westovers. Based on his office's records, Cundick sent a letter to Rocky Mountain
Power stating that the Westovers did not own the property in question. The Westovers sought a
writ of mandate to require Cundick to retract the letter and a writ of prohibition to prevent him
from sending such letters in the future. The district court denied the Westovers' request for writs
of mandate and prohibition after it concluded that there were other remedies available at law.
On appeal, the Westovers assert that the district court erred by failing to grant injunctive
relief prohibiting Cundick from sending out letters concerning real estate transactions and

property ownership. Although the Westovers' complaint did not request that the district court
grant injunctive relief, they assert that the district court erred because the Westovers were clearly
entitled to injunctive relief under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( c ). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November of 2007, the Westovers entered into a contract to purchase the family farm
(Property) from Val's parents Don and Connie Westover. On November 27, 2007, the Westovers
recorded a Memorandum of Real Estate Contract with the Franklin County Recorder's Office.
The sales contract itself was not recorded and the records in the recorder's office continued to
show that Don and Connie Westover were the owners of the Property. On February 25, 2008,
two quitclaim deeds with respect to the same Property were recorded between Don and Connie
Westover and Dexter and Linda Ralphs to adjust the acreage of their respective properties. The
quitclaim deeds indicated that Don and Connie Westover remained the owners of the Property.
On December 3, 2012, a warranty deed conveying the Property from Don Westover to
the Don A. Westover Trust was recorded. Based on that warranty deed, the assessor's office
updated its records to show the Don A. Westover Trust as the owner of the Property. On March
17, 2015, the Westovers conveyed an underground right of way easement on the Property to
Rocky Mountain Power as part of a contract to receive power for their business. The easement
was recorded on April 20, 2015. The Westovers then paid $37,000 to install lines and equipment
to receive electrical service.
On May 14, 2015, a warranty deed dated November 17, 2007, conveying the Property
from Don and Connie Westover to the Westovers was recorded. On May 29, 2015, Cundick sent
a letter to the Westovers and Rocky Mountain Power informing them of his concern that "the
property description included in [the April 20, 2015 Underground Right of Way Easement] is not
owned by the Grantor .... " Cundick's office did not obtain information regarding the May 14,
2015, recorded deed until after he sent his letter.
Rocky Mountain Power contacted the W estovers about the letter and informed them they
would need to correct the problem within thirty days or it would turn off the Westovers' power
and remove its equipment. After speaking with the Westovers, Rocky Mountain Power agreed
not to take any action until the Westovers had addressed the problem. The Westovers contacted
the assessor's office requesting that it retract the May 29 letter. Despite communication between
the parties and eventual communication through the parties' attorneys, the dispute was not
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resolved. On June 8, 2015, a quitclaim deed conveying the Property from the Don A. Westover
Family Trust to the Westovers was recorded. At that time, the assessor's office changed its
records to reflect the Westovers as the owners of the Property
On July 30, 2015, the Westovers filed their complaint against Cundick. The Westovers
amended their complaint August 20, 2015, suing Cundick in his individual and official capacities
and seeking writs of mandate and prohibition, damages for slander of title, and intentional
interference with existing or potential economic relations.
On September 14, 2015, Cundick moved to dismiss the action. Cundick argued that the
Westovers lacked standing to pursue their claims because they had not presented evidence of an
injury in fact. Further, Cundick argued that the Westovers' claim for writs of mandate and
prohibition should be dismissed because Cundick had not violated any clear legal right or had a
clear legal duty to retract the letter and there were alternative remedies at law available to the
Westovers. On October 23, 2015, the Westovers moved for summary judgment.
In November 12, 2015, the district court vacated the scheduled hearings on Cundick's
motion to dismiss and the Westovers' motion for summary judgment in order to give the parties
an opportunity to mediate the dispute. On December 11, 2015, Cundick sent the Westovers and
Rocky Mountain Power a letter retracting his previous claim that the W estovers did not own the
Property. On January 6, 2016, the Westovers filed a motion for the district court to issue the
requested writs of mandate and prohibition and to dismiss their remaining claims without
prejudice. The parties unsuccessfully participated in mediation on January 15, 2016.
On February 11, 2016, the district court held a hearing on the Westovers' motion. The
district court granted the Westovers' motion to dismiss their claims for slander of title and
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; however, the district court denied the
Westovers' requests for writs of mandate and prohibition, concluding there were other available
remedies at law. The Westovers timely appealed.
II. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

"This Court reviews questions of law de novo." State, Dep 't of Health & We(lare v.
Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321, 325 (2004 ). "Statutory interpretation is a question of
law over which this Court exercises free review." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 748,
274 P.3d 1256, 1263 (2012).
III. ANALYSIS

3

On appeal, the Westovers argue: ( 1) the district court erred in refusing to grant injunctive
relief prohibiting Cundick from sending out letters to parties concerning real estate transactions
and property ownership; and (2) the district court erred by failing to grant injunctive relief that
was not demanded in the pleadings where under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( c) it clearly
appeared that the Westovers were entitled to injunctive relief.

A. The district court did not have a duty to sua sponte grant the Westovers injunctive
relief not requested in their pleadings.
The district court denied the Westovers' request for writs of mandate and prohibition,
reasoning that the issuance of an extraordinary writ was inappropriate given that the W estovers
could have sought injunctive relief. This ruling was correct. It is only appropriate for a court to
issue an extraordinary writ "where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." I.C. § 7-303 (writ of mandate); LC.§ 7-402 (writ of prohibition). "The
existence of an adequate remedy in the course of legal procedure, either legal or equitable in
nature, will prevent the issuance of a writ of mandamus." Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 501,
960 P.2d 181, 184 (1998) (citing Edwards v. Industrial Comm 'n of State, 130 Idaho 457, 45960, 943 P.2d 47, 49-50 (1997)). Likewise, the availability of injunctive relief warrants dismissal
of an action for a writ of prohibition. Wasden ex rel. State v. Idaho State Bd. of Land Comm 'rs,
150 Idaho 547, 551-54, 249 P.3d 346, 350-53 (2010).
The Westovers do not challenge the district court's reasoning. However, they contend the
district court erred by failing to sua sponte grant injunctive relief under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(c). In support of their argument, the Westovers rely upon this Court's decision in

McKay Construction Co. v. Ada County Board of County Commissioners, 99 Idaho 235, 580
P.2d 412 (1978). The Westovers contend that in McKay "this Court held that a district court
erred in simply dismissing a case challenging the ultra vires actions of government officials
rather than using its power under Rule 54( c) to grant the remedy to which the party was entitled
even where it had not been requested."
The question whether Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) and our precedent imposed a
duty upon the district court to sua sponte grant injunctive relief not requested in the Westovers'
pleadings is a matter of first impression for this Court to decide.

4

At the time of the proceedings before the district court, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54( c) provided, in pertinent part: 1 "Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is

rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." (emphasis
added). The district court did not reach the merits of the Westovers' arguments because it
concluded that it would dismiss the Westovers' actions for extraordinary writs because of the
availability of equitable remedies. Under the plain language of the rule, the Westovers were not
entitled to injunctive relief as they were not the "party in whose favor" the judgment was
rendered.
Further, the Westovers have misinterpreted this Court's holding in McKay. In McKay,
McKay sought writs of mandate and prohibition to prevent a third party (Whitmore) from
performing a sanitary landfill contract Ada County awarded to Whitmore as the low bidder.

McKay, 99 Idaho at 236, 580 P.2d at 413. McKay sought to compel Ada County to award the
contract to McKay as the lowest licensed bidder and to recover damages from Ada County for
lost earnings. Id. McKay asserted that relief should be granted because the third party failed to
comply with statutory bonding and licensing requirements. Id. The district court dismissed
McKay's petition concluding that Whitmore's indemnity bond satisfied statutory requirements
and that the statutory sanctions provided in Idaho Code section 53-1920 for contracting without a
license did not automatically void the contract. Id. at 237, 580 P.2d at 414.
We reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings concluding: (1) "LC. § 541926 requires a bond executed by a surety authorized to do business in Idaho, and the county was
not at liberty to waive that requirement in favor of some alternative form of security;" and (2)
"Whitmore was not eligible to bid on or receive the county's sanitary landfill contract because
Whitmore did not have a public works contractor's license as required by LC. § 54-1902." Id. at
238-39, 580 P.2d at 415-16.
This Court referred to Rule 54(c) once in McKay, addressing the county and Whitmore's
erroneous claim that their contract was not void. We reasoned that "it is apparent that even if the
county's contract with Whitmore is not absolutely void as between the parties to it, McKay may

1 Effective July I, 2016, the rule was amended. It now provides, in pertinent part: "Every other final judgment
should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings."
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nevertheless be entitled to injunctive relief against Whitmore's continued performance without a
public works contractor's license. See I.R.C.P. 54(c)." Id. at 240, 580 P.2d at 417.
Nowhere in McKay did this Court suggest that the district court's failure to consider
injunctive relief under Rule 54( c) was the basis for our reversal of the district court decision. As
Cundick correctly argues: "It appears that the Westovers, in analyzing McKay, have conflated
the issues of the special writs as to Ada County with the injunction as to Whitmore
Transportation, and thus come to an incorrect conclusion." We hold that the district court did not
err by failing to sua sponte grant injunctive relief that was not sought in the Westovers'
pleadings.

B. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-117. The statute
provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state
agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on
appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the non-prevailing party acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
I.C. § 12-117. Because the issue whether the district court had a duty to sua sponte grant
injunctive relief not requested in the Westovers' pleadings based on Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54( c) is an issue of first impression, we do not award attorney fees to either party on
appeal. "A party is not entitled to attorney's fees if the issue is one of first impression in Idaho."

Fuchs v. State, Dep 't of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control, 152 Idaho 626,
632, 272 P.3d 1257, 1263 (2012) (citing Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87,
91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007)).

IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court and award Cundick costs on appeal.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, JONES and BRODY, CONCUR.
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Exhibit H

COURT: Would you say this is a practice throughout the state?
RESPONDENTS' COUNSEL: Sending letters in general is a practice.
Supreme Court Audio Transcript #44046 held February 17, 2017 at 13:31.

Exhibit I

THE COURT: I guess what I'm struggling with is this pigheaded insistence of the
prerogative to send letters like this in the future."
Supreme Court Audio Transcript #44046 held February 7, 2017 at 14:03.
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24
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1

THE COURT:

1

We'll be on the record at this time in

2

the matter of Val D. Westover and Laree H. Westover as

3

plaintiffs versus Jay see Cundick, Franklin County

4

assessor.

5

have appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr. Blake

6

Atkin.

7

Mr. Castleton.

This is Franklin County case CV-2015-312.

I

I have appearing on behalf of the defendant not

8

MR. WILLIAMS:

9

THE COURT:

Tyler Williams, Your Honor.

Mr. Tyler Williams.

All right.

This

10

matter is set for a hearing today on a motion to dismiss

11

filed by the defendant in this matter.

12

supported by a memorandum in support of partial motion to

13

dismiss.

14

asking for an outright dismissal?

15
16
17

That motion is

I think partial might be a mistake.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Yes, outright.

You are

Alternatively a

partial.
THE COURT:

All right.

I've also received a motion

18

for summary judgment and plaintiff's memorandum in support

19

of motion for summary judgment in response to the motion

20

for summary judgment to dismiss.

21

a number of affidavits.

22

noticed for hearing today,

23

He's consolidated his memorandum in support of his motion

24

for summary judgment and his response to the motion to

25

dismiss.

That's been supported by

Mr. Atkin, his motion was not
I assume on a timeliness issue.

Is that correct, Mr. Atkin?

2

1

MR. ATKIN:

That's correct, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

Have you set your motion for summary

3

judgment for hearing yet?

4

MR. ATKIN:

We have.

5

THE COURT:

Before we hear argument on this motion

December something.

6

today,

I asked counsel yesterday to make sure their

7

clients are present today for this hearing.

8

just discuss, before we hear argument on this matter,

9

inquire of both parties about what it is we're doing in

10

this particular case.

11

supporting documents today.

12

here, to be frank.

13

I read this complaint,

I wanted to

I read the

I can't figure out why we're

Mr. Atkin, why are we here?

14

MR. ATKIN:

I had the same kind of question, Your

15

Honor.

16

been easily resolved.

17

This seemed to me to be something that could have

THE COURT:

We asked

By, one,

18

two,

19

right, and recording them?

filing your warranty deed or,

filing your real estate purchase and sale agreement,

20

MR. ATKIN:

We recorded the memorandum of the sale.

21

THE COURT:

But that's not either one of the

22

conveying documents.

23

and where is the warranty deed and why aren't they

24

recorded?

25

MR. ATKIN:

Where is the real estate agreement

The warranty deed has now been

3

1

2

recorded.

It was recorded after --

THE COURT:

Then why are we here?

3

wasting -- paying attorneys?

4

if the warranty deed is recorded?

5

MR. ATKIN:

Why are we

The issue is moot,

It's not moot,

isn't it,

Your Honor, because the

6

letter that was sent by the assessor's office to Rocky

7

Mountain Power represented that my clients did not own the

8

property at the time.

9

THE COURT:

Clearly anyone who does a check with

10

the recorder's office could see that now there's been a

11

warranty deed file,

12
13
14

MR. ATKIN:

correct?
In fact,

anyone who checked with the

recorder's office would have found our memorandum.
THE COURT:

Understood.

But I'm not sure that

15

addresses my question.

16

by way of a writ of mandate or a writ of prohibition now

17

that hasn't been accomplished by filing the warranty deed?

18
19
20
21

22

MR. ATKIN:

What to you want from this court

A letter from the assessor's office

telling the power company that at the time my clients -THE COURT:

Why do we care about the time?

Why

don't we care about today?
MR. ATKIN:

Because that's -- the letter called

23

into question the ownership of the property at the time

24

that the easement

25

THE COURT:

And I assume an argument can be made

4

1

that the memorandum of real estate contract wasn't an

2

actual document demonstrating a conveyance of the

3

property, it's just someone vouching for the fact that

4

that transfer has occurred.

5

get into that argument right now.

6

understand is why are we spending attorney fees now to

7

litigate a moot issue?

I'm not sure I really want to
What I want to

8

MR. ATKIN:

It's not moot.

9

THE COURT:

On the writ of prohibition or on the

10

writ of mandate?
MR. ATKIN:

11

Yes.

Because the letter sent by the

12

assessor's office brought into question my clients'

13

ownership of the property.

14

THE COURT:

At a point in time?

15

MR. ATKIN:

That's correct.

16

THE COURT:

Does Rocky Mountain Power care about

And it raised

17

what was the state of affairs in August or do they care

18

about what the state of affairs is today?
MR. ATKIN:

19

Of course they care what the state of

20

affairs were, Your Honor, because if my client didn't own

21

the property at the time he granted the easement, then

22

they don't have an easement.

23

issues

24
25

THE COURT:

Stop.

You have certain property

Why don't we just write the

letter and say as of today's date it appears that a

5

1

warranty deed has been filed and that's the state of the

2

record as of today's date?

3

MR. WILLIAMS:

I think we could probably do that,

4

Your Honor.

I think everything -- I'm a little perplexed.

5

I don't know what the case or controversy is here at this

6

point either.

7

the -- I think it was a quit claim deed, not a warranty

8

deed, to clarify the record, but it's my understanding

9

that that was filed.

That's why we moved on standing.

After

10

THE COURT:

A quit claim deed, not a warranty deed?

11

MR. ATKIN:

It was a warranty deed, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

Which is what the

13

MR. ATKIN:

The contract called for a warranty

14

deed.

15

contract was completed.

16

as the memorandum said we would.

17

18
19
20
21

I've held it in escrow for eight years.

THE COURT:

We then filed the warranty deed
And a letter to --

Why did you file the memorandum instead

of the real estate purchase and sale agreement?
MR. ATKIN:

The real estate purchase and sale

agreement is several pages and it has -THE COURT:

But it's the agreement that transfers

22

the property.

23

probably the concern that Mr. Cundick had?

24
25

The

Doesn't that avoid the confusion and

MR. ATKIN:

Well, actually the memorandum is

sufficient.

6

1
2
3

THE COURT:
position.

I understand that that is your

That's not responsive to my question.

MR. ATKIN:

There is personal information in the

4

contract that we didn't want the public knowing about.

5

The public needed to know that there had been a contract

6

entered into by which Dallas Paris sold them the farm.

7

That memorandum that we filed spells out all that needs to

8

be spelled out.

9

THE COURT:

In fact
So as you stand here today, your client

10

is not satisfied with the letter from Mr. Cundick, as the

11

assessor for Franklin County, stating to Rocky Mountain

12

Power that as of today, and as of whatever day that

13

warranty deed was filed, he concedes that your clients

14

were the owner of that property?

15

or your clients?

16
17
18

MR. ATKIN:

I does not.

That doesn't satisfy you

The letter needs to say on

the date that the easement
THE COURT:

Explain that to me.

I assume your

19

warranty deed reflects back to a purchase and sale

20

agreement in 2007, correct?

21

MR. ATKIN:

Yes.

22

THE COURT:

So I don't understand.

It seems to me

I don't know how much

23

like we are spinning our wheels.

24

the Westovers have paid you,

25

county has paid Mr. Williams's firm, but this seems

I don't know how much the

7

1

ludicrous.

2
3

That's the way I viewed it.

We

THE COURT:

And I view it that way from both

asked

4

5

MR. ATKIN:

parties' perspective.

6

MR. ATKIN:

Well, we've asked them to write the

7

letter admitting that they made the mistake and that on

8

the day when they wrote the letter -THE COURT:

9

I'm not sure I concede that they made a

10

mistake, but that gets to the issue on point.

11

stop the hemorrhaging?

12

money and Mr. Williams a lot money for an issue that seems

13

moot and silly?

14

MR. ATKIN:

Why are we here paying you a lot

It's not, Your Honor.

15

Let me explain.

16

easement to Rocky Mountain Power, he had

17

property.

18

But why not

It's not silly.

On the day that my clients conveyed an
he owned the

I'm prepared to show that.

THE COURT:

I understand.

And it's a matter of

19

principle that someone concede that he owned it on that

20

day.

21

MR. ATKIN:

It's not just a matter of principle.

22

If I may explain, he owned the property on the day that he

23

conveyed the easement to Rocky Mountain Power.

24

assessor's office said that he didn't own the property on

25

the day that he conveyed the easement to Rocky Mountain

8

The

1

Power.

2

If he had conveyed a fee interest to Rocky

3

Mountain Power by warranty deed, then the doctrines that

4

you're talking about, where the warranty comes in and

5

corrects errors in ownership that occurred -- that were

6

corrected after the fact,

7

care of that.

8

grant an easement I have to own the property on the day

9

that I granted the easement.

10

a warranty deed would have taken

But a grant of an easement

THE COURT:

in order to

I'm not questioning that.

I assume

11

what you have represented to me is true.

12

transfer of interest between Mr. Westover and his father.

13

I'm assuming that as he negotiated that easement with

14

Rocky Mountain Power that he would be able to demonstrate

15

to them,

16

verification from the assessor's office, that this

17

transaction did occur.

18

separate and eight part from any documentation or

Mr. Westover is wanting to speak.

19

you to if your attorney is okay with it.

20

Atkin.

21

There was a

MR. ATKIN:

I'll allow

It's up to Mr.

And I don't have any objection to Mr.

22

Westover speaking, but we needed to establish

23

the cloud removed from Mr. Westover's ownership of the

24

property, because what the assessor

25

THE COURT:

--

we needed

--

Did you ever take your real estate

9

1

purchase and sale agreement to Rocky Mountain Power and

2

say here's the transfer?

3

MR. ATKIN:

No.

4

THE COURT:

Why not?

5

Or did you want to pick a

fight and have a lawsuit?

6

MR. ATKIN:

No.

7

THE COURT:

Then why didn't you?

8

MR. ATKIN:

We might have been able to resolve one

9

aspect of the ownership question.

10

THE COURT:

One aspect or the aspect?

11

MR. ATKIN:

Well, the aspect as it relates to this

12

case.

13

ownership of this property and Val's ownership of this

14

property beginning back in November of 2007.

But, Your Honor, there are other issues relating to

15

THE COURT:

What are those?

16

MR. ATKIN:

Issues relating to family questions.

17

Don and Connie Westover are now both dead.

18

family questions about who inherited or who had the right

19

to this property.

20

THE COURT:

21
22

There's been

How do those relate to the request and

negotiations for an easement with Rocky Mountain Power?
MR. ATKIN:

Because the letter written by Mr.

23

Cundick didn't just say your easement isn't valid, what

24

the letter said is

25

THE COURT:

They don't own the property?

10

1

2
3

MR. ATKIN:

Val Westover doesn't own the property

described in the easement.
THE COURT:

And my question being, did you ever

4

take your real estate sale and purchase agreement, or your

5

warranty deed that you held in escrow, and present that to

6

Rocky Mountain Power and say for whatever reason he feels

7

like he wants to pick this fight,

8

9

MR. ATKIN:

he's wrong?

We did tell the power company that

we gave them assurances that we owned the property.

10

THE COURT:

Did you show them the paperwork?

11

MR. ATKIN:

They didn't ask to see it.

12
13

We told

them that we owned it.
MR. WESTOVER:

They didn't want to see it.

They

14

said you have a certain amount of time.

And he says the

15

legal department has seen this letter.

16

got mine yet.

17

over and taking the power and shut you down.

18

grand you just spent to move and put all this stuff in

19

you'll lose.

Of course I hadn't

So he called me up and says we're coming

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. WESTOVER:

And the 30

And what happened?
Because they had a letter from the

22

county and the legal department in Salt Lake was telling

23

Craig Bolton this.

24

the property,

25

little misunderstanding.

So I calmed him down and I said we own

it's not a problem.

I'm sure there's just a

I'm sure I can clear this right

11

1

up.

2

I said can I see the letter.

He says,

I'll

3

make you a copy.

I ran over and he copied it and we

4

stepped outside and had a little visit.

5

it may take you a week or two to resolve this.

6

the heat from Salt Lake for a little while.

7

have to do is you have to resolve this thing with the

8

county assessor's office.

9

interested in coming up to Franklin County and determining

He said, listen,
I can take

But what you

The legal department is not

10

this.

And he didn't say that, but that's what I got from

11

the conversation.

12

interested in coming up here and deciding who.

13

slandered my ownership of the property and you fix it or

14

we'll take our stuff and shut you down.

15

employees.

Their legal department wasn't

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. WESTOVER:

Yes.

We have negotiated and talked

several times.

19

happen is for this issue to be resolved.

21
22

I've got 28

Have you heard from them since?

18

20

Somebody

The only thing that they want to have

THE COURT:

And you don't think it's resolved by

the filing of the warranty deed?
MR. WESTOVER:

There's two ways that in my

23

understanding we can resolve this.

24

say, yes, he did own it at that time, then it's in

25

writing, the issue would then be resolved.

12

If the county was to

If the county

1

insists the only way that they will do that is to say Val

2

does now own the property, which I don't think that's

3

true.

4

deceptive,

5

that's as far as we can go, then we have to go back in and

6

grant them another easement.

7

on my character that I would grant an easement to someone

8

that I didn't own the property on.

9

That's at least in part a lie because it's
implying that I didn't own it then.

But if

Of course it leaves a slur

It may affect my future relations with Rocky

10

Mountain Power.

I suppose I could live with that, but my

11

problem was that I assured Craig Bolton -- can I continue

12

here for a little bit with some of the things that concern

13

me?

I'm a busy businessman.

I don't have a law degree.
You're fine.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. WESTOVER:

So I assured, hey,

no problem.

16

There's a little misunderstanding,

17

course I came over and I talked to Denise and her and I

18

were not speaking the same language.

19

problem was I thought, you know,

20

my pay grade and I don't understand it.

21

trouble with you, Denise, and I left.

22

I'll clear it up.

Of

And part of the

this is a little but over
I don't need

I called brother Cundick, Mr. Cundick, and I
I'm not understanding

23

tried to resolve it on the phone.

24

why he didn't think I owned the property, on what basis,

25

and he and I were not communicating.

13

So I gave that up.

1

In fact,

I might have -- I was very frustrated.

2

might have hung up, but I don't believe I swore.

3

I think I

So then I said, Blake, you need to go over

4

there and fix this because this is serious.

5

I want you to do first is to go over and double check our

6

paperwork, make sure that our I's are dotted, that we

7

didn't miss something.

8
9

I says, what

So Blake come -- because he's the one that
filed all the papers.

He drew up the original contract,

10

he's done it all.

11

and talked to Denise.

12

not able to convince Denise that we owned the property.

13

He came back and said I'm frustrated.

14

and see the assessor and straighten it out.

15

do that.

16

I wanted it done right.

He came over

And they went through and he was

Blake tried.

I said get ahold
You've got to

Mr. Cundick refused to return

17

his phone calls.

18

back and he says you have to clear the title to the

19

property.

20

back over and double check again and make sure that it's

21

all right.

22

This went on for some time.

Blake comes

So, Blake, before we do anything, will you go

Try one more time.
He tried again, double checked the paperwork.

23

Came back and reported that we have not missed anything.

24

I told you.

25

well, what is my options here.

So he says what are we going to do?

I says,

And Blake said before we

14

1

file a lawsuit why don't we write a letter and let them

2

know how serious this is.

Give them a week to respond.

Now we're into this project six weeks and my

3

4

power can go off at any time.

5

put my whole life into.

6

don't have any -- there's no savings.

7

is in this business.
THE COURT:

8

9
10

I don't have a retirement.

I

Every dime I've got

Mr. Westover, let me ask you question.

Had Rocky Mountain Power cut off your power, do you think
they would been in breach of the contract with you?

11

MR. WESTOVER:

12

THE COURT:

13

I have a business that I've

I think --

Do you think they had any legal basis

to assert that you're not the owner of that property?

14

MR. WESTOVER:

15

THE COURT:

You know,

I'm not a lawyer.

You said you've been having

16

communications with Mr. Atkin.

17

transfer of the property between you and your father was

18

legal?

19

MR. WESTOVER:

20

THE COURT:

Did he tell you that the

Yes.

Did he tell you that Rocky Mountain

21

Power had any legal right in which to invalidate or cut

22

off the easement?

23

MR. WESTOVER:

24

him the question.

25

THE COURT:

Blake didn't say that.

I didn't ask

Enough of this for a minute.

15

Mr.

1

Williams, why is your client so intent on picking this

2

fight,

3

elected official with the Franklin County assessor's

4

office would be?

5

issue?

6

which seems to exceed perhaps what his role as an

Why does he concern himself with this

MR. WILLIAMS:

We attempted to resolve this matter

7

back in August.

8

basically this is moot, there's now a deed in place.

9

We sent a letter to Mr. Atkin that said

THE COURT:

But that's not my question.

Why did he

10

involve himself in the first instance?

11

responsibility to notify Rocky Mountain Power, or a third

12

party, that he feels like a filing with the recorder's

13

office should be responded to or that he should police

14

those issues?

15

MR. WILLIAMS:

Does he have any

That's the practice of the

16

assessor's office and has been for a number of years.

17

When there is a question as to ownership --

18
19
20
21
22

THE COURT:

Again,

it might be a practice, but is

there any legal or statutory authority that he do that?
MR. WILLIAMS:

There is no authority to prohibit

him from doing it.
THE COURT:

And in fact he holds himself out to a

23

lawsuit such as this if he's incorrect in his legal

24

assessment of the state of affairs,

25

MR. WILLIAMS:

Yes,

correct.

16

correct?
As we now know.

I

1
2

3
4

don't believe this ever has been one before.
THE COURT:

So maybe that practice needs to be

revisited.
MR. WILLIAMS:

In the

I'm sure it will be.

It has happened for a number of

5

meantime, it happened.

6

years and we have tried to resolve this case.

7

with an amended complaint instead of a resolution.

8
9

THE COURT:

We were met

Here's what I'm going to do today.

I'll allow you folks to argue your motions in this matter,

10

but I'm going to order between now and the time of the

11

hearing on the summary judgment that you parties sit down,

12

either together or with a mediator.

13

mediator to assist you in matter I'll appoint one.

14

If there is not a resolution,

15

the motion for summary judgment.

16

dismiss under advisement.

17

respect to these issues.

18

And if you need a

I'll entertain

I'll take the motion to

I'll issue my ruling with

I don't think it's in anyone's best interest
I think this

19

to continue this fight and this litigation.

20

should have been resolved and could have been resolved if

21

there had been an effort to do that.

22

to me that we're going to continue to incur additional

23

attorney fees and costs beyond sitting down and figuring

24

out a way to get this matter resolved.

25

It seems ludicrous

If it's not, then I'll take up the motions and

17

1

I'll issue my rulings and we'll see where that takes us.

2

But there's a good chance that that will take us to an

3

issue concerning additional claims for attorney fees and

4

costs and it just seems not in the parties' best interests

5

to do that.

6
7

Would you like to argue your motion today, Mr.
Atkin?

8

MR. ATKIN:

It's not my motion, Your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

That's correct.

10
11

MR. WILLIAMS:

It does and I've closely reviewed it.

THE COURT:

13

MR. WILLIAMS:

15
16
17
18
19

I can, but I think the briefing sets

it out pretty clearly.

12

14

Mr. Williams.

So unless the court has any

questions I'm happy to rest on what is in the briefing.
THE COURT:

Mr. Atkin, do you want to argue in

response?
MR. ATKIN:

I do if the court is going to take the

matter under advisement, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

I intend to take it under advisement,

20

but not issue any ruling until you have an opportunity to

21

conduct mediation in advance of summary judgment hearing.

22

Then I would hear you.

23

hear from you at the summary judgment hearing and then

24

take both matters under advisement.

25

MR. ATKIN:

If you don't get it resolved,

I'll

I'm fine waiting as long as I get the

18

1

chance at some point to argue it.

2
3

4
5
6
7

8

9
10
11

THE COURT:

I hope you don't.

MR. ATKIN:

I agree.

it.
In the event we don't,

THE COURT:

Do you want some help from the court

regarding a mediator?
MR. ATKIN:

We would, Your Honor.

some help with a mediator.
available?
THE COURT:

I don't think Judge Hunn does

13

magistrate judge up in Caribou County.

16

I think we need

If Judge Hunn is still

mediations anymore.

15

I

would like the opportunity to argue.

12

14

I hope you settle

MR. ATKIN:

I would suggest Judge Kress.

He's a

I don't know him, but if you recommend

him that's okay.
THE COURT:

K-r-e-s-s.

He's been handling a number

17

of mediations for me.

18

Judge Dunn, but he won't be able to get you in before your

19

motion for summary judgment is scheduled for hearing,

20

which is December 10th.

21

MR. ATKIN:

When could Judge Dunn be ready?

22

THE COURT:

Not until after the first of the year.

23

MR. ATKIN:

I know Judge Dunn.

24
25

The other name I would have is

I would prefer

Judge Dunn be the mediator.
THE COURT:

Are you willing to push out your

19

1

summary judgment hearing?

2

MR. ATKIN:

(Pause in the proceedings.)

3

MR. ATKIN:

4

5

Give me a moment.

We're willing to wait until January for

the mediation.
THE COURT:

6

I'll make an effort to get Judge Dunn

7

in place for you guys sometime in January and I'll vacate

8

the hearing today.

9

Mr. and Mrs. Westover,

I hope you don't think

10

I'm a grouchy old judge.

11

Cundick as well.

12

able to get resolved and it shouldn't be in front of this

13

court.

14

process, then I'll do my job and I'll make my rulings.

15

But you guys need to figure out a way to get this

16

resolved.

17

offended anybody.

18

MR. ATKIN:

You didn't apologize to me.

19

THE COURT:

You too, Blake.

If do you,

I'm sorry.

And Mr.

This is a case that you guys should be

If it is at the conclusion of the mediation

I hope I haven't

That's my take on it.

20

it from me and I from you.

21

MR. WESTOVER:

You're used to getting

This would be a win/win for me.

We

22

tried everything to get a meeting and sit down on what we

23

need to do.

24

25

THE COURT:

I think it will be a win/win for both

of you only if you resolve it.

That's what you need to

20

1

do.
MS. WESTOVER:

2

3

We asked them to respond or have a

visit is all we ever asked for.

4

THE COURT:

I'll vacate the summary judgment

5

hearing and contact Judge Dunn and then have him be in

6

contact with your offices about a mediation date in

7

January.

8

MR. ATKIN:

9

MR. WILLIAMS:

10
11
12

THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you, Your Honor.

With that, we'll be in recess at this

time.
(Hearing concluded.)

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1
2
3
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1

THE COURT:

We'll be on the record in the matter of

2

Val B. Westover and Laree H. Westover versus Jace D.

3

Cundick in his individual capacity and in his official

4

capacity as Franklin County assessor.

5

County case CV-2015-312.

6

represented in this proceeding by Mr. Blake Atkin.

7

defendant is being represented in this matter by Mr. Bruce

8

Castleton.

9

The plaintiffs are being
The

I've received the submissions of the parties
I've reviewed them and I am prepared to

10

in this matter.

11

hear argument at this time.

12

plaintiff.

13

This is Franklin

MR. ATKIN:

Mr. Atkin, I'll hear from the

Thank you, Your Honor.

At this point

14

in time the assessor has written the letter that we

15

requested to the power company correcting the false

16

assertion that my clients were not the owners of the real

17

estate at the time that they entered into a contract with

18

the power company and conveyed an easement to the power

19

company for power service to their property and business.

20

With that letter we filed the current motion

21

with the court asking that the court enter a judgment, a

22

writ of prohibition, preventing future conduct of the sort

23

by the assessor.

24

had filed and we move the court at the same time to

25

dismiss those claims without prejudice so the entire

We also had some other claims that we

2

1

matter can be dismissed.

2

In response to our motion the assessor has

3

taken the position that the case should be resolved as a

4

result of their previously filed motion to dismiss for

5

lack of standing.

6

serious concern.

7

entitled to a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition.

8

I guess at this point it would be writ of prohibition.

9

Because while the assessor retains the discretion to do

They make arguments that cause me
They take the position that we're not

10

this kind of thing again in the future, there's no

11

evidence in the record that he's now doing it.

12

while he might do it in the future, there is nothing

13

pending and so therefore we can't obtain any kind of

14

relief in terms of a writ of prohibition against conduct

15

that isn't currently being done, but might be planned in

16

the future.

17

Therefore,

The other position that the assessor takes

18

that causes me and my clients grave concern is that the

19

assessor takes the position that what he did in this case

20

was a discretionary function because there's nothing in

21

the statute that prohibits him from doing the things that

22

he did.

23

discretionary function for a government official is.

24

Discretionary function doesn't mean that because the

25

statute doesn't prohibit the government official from

That is not my understanding of what a

3

1

doing something therefore he's free to do it.

My

2

understanding of a discretionary function is the way it's

3

defined in the tort claims act, a discretionary function

4

is something for which the government actor is shielded

5

because he is performing a duty that was properly

6

delegated to him under statute or regulation.

7

THE COURT:

8

entities work, correct?

9

MR. ATKIN:

That's correct.

10

THE COURT:

They have no authority to act unless

11
12

And in fact that's how governmental

there is statutory authority for them to so act, correct?
MR. ATKIN:

I absolutely agree, Your Honor.

So

13

this notion that because he's not prohibited to do it what

14

he is doing is a discretionary function.

15

THE COURT:

16

crusade?

17

this case?

I guess my question for you, why this

The wrong that you perceive has been righted in

18

MR. ATKIN:

It has.

19

THE COURT:

And now you want to fight the battle

20
21

for the rest of Franklin County.
MR. ATKIN:

Well, what we want, Your Honor,

is a

22

judgment prohibiting this kind of thing from happening

23

again to us or to anyone else in Franklin County.

24

reason is the same reason as the court --

25

THE COURT:

The

But you're asking this court to employ

4

1

an extraordinary judicial function and issue an

2

extraordinary writ.

3

be, if your client was so threatened, or if some other

4

citizen of Franklin County was so threatened,

5

to seek redress through an extraordinary writ, file a

6

motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary

7

injunction?

8

writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition suggest that

9

they're only available if there's not an adequate remedy

10

Why wouldn't the appropriate recourse

rather than

Doesn't both the statutory framework for a

in law?

11

MR. ATKIN:

That's correct.

12

THE COURT:

Wouldn't an action in a future

13

occurrence be equally available to your client if a

14

similar circumstance arose, or to any other citizen of

15

Franklin County?

16
17
18

MR. ATKIN:

That's entirely possible.

However --

and that might be the appropriate remedy.
THE COURT:

That seems to be what the case law is

19

telling me that I have reviewed.

That seems to be what

20

the statutory framework is telling me, that if there's an

21

adequate remedy at law, and it seems to me in this

22

instance, back in November or September or August, that

23

would have been an appropriate means whereby you come in

24

and obtain injunctive relief instead of seeking this

25

extraordinary judicial writ.

5

1

MR. ATKIN:

Actually, injunctive relief is a remedy

2

in equity rather than a remedy at law.

3

slicing the question pretty fine.
THE COURT:

4

That might be

I'm not prepared to argue that

5

distinction.

6

Rule of Civil Procedure 65.

7

bases upon which you can obtain an injunction.
MR. ATKIN:

8
9
10

It's rule based in Idaho.

It's based on

There's also many statutory

I'm just saying that historically

injunctive relief is equitable rather than a remedy at
law.

11

I guess my point today, there's been

12

tremendous resources spent with the court and with the

13

parties framing this issue up.

14

clear that there needs to be some kind of remedy.

15

court thinks that the proper remedy, rather than being a

16

writ of prohibition, would be an injunction against future

17

conduct, and conduct that isn't just speculative but that

18

the assessor in their responding papers have said we

19

retain the discretion to do it and we might do it again in

20

the future.

21

At this point I think it's
If the

Given that threat, while procedurally we might

22

not have framed it that way,

it would seem to me

23

appropriate for this court at this point, at this stage,

24

to enter a judgment.

25

injunction prohibiting future such conduct by the assessor

And whether that judgment is an

6

1

or a writ of prohibition, we'd be satisfied with either

2

one of those results.

3

If the court has any questions I'm happy to

4

answer them, but I think the court understands our

5

position.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. CASTLETON:

I do.

Thank you.

Mr. Castleton.

Thank you for your time this

8

afternoon, Your Honor.

9

it.

The court has our briefing before

I know the court has looked at the issues here.

A

10

really important thing I think for the court to consider

11

here, first of all, with respect to any injunctive relief,

12

the plaintiffs have not pled for any injunctive relief.

13

don't think the court can just grant that sua sponte this

14

afternoon.

15

improper, and I know plaintiffs' counsel disagrees, but it

16

is certainly our position that they have not shown that

17

the assessor was outside of his authority in issuing the

18

letter that he did.

And even more so I think that would be

THE COURT:

19

I

I'm not -I don't know that that's a direction

20

you want to take with me.

21

there.

I think that Mr. Atkin's argument is right on

22

point.

A public official's duty to act arises from

23

statute and statutory authority, correct?

24

MR. CASTLETON:

25

THE COURT:

I probably disagree with you

That is correct, Your Honor.

Is there any statutory authority where

7

1

the assessor should involve himself in this type of

2

activity or conduct?

3

MR. CASTLETON:

Idaho code 63-307,

subsection one,

4

mandates that the assessor determine the ownership of

5

property.

6

THE COURT:

For tax purposes.

7

MR. CASTLETON:

Yes.

But this is no different.

8

This is him essentially looking at the record and saying

9

that he sees a discrepancy.

He's merely offering a

10

service to the residents of the county to say I see an

11

issue here.

12

they want to take care of.

13

If it's an issue,

it might be something that

Statutory framework does not set forth every

14

single aspect of what the assessor's office does.

15

gives to the assessor some discretion to operate that

16

office so that he brings to pass the statutory

17

obligations.

18

THE COURT:

That

And the proper exercise of that

19

discretion can get him involved in a slander of title

20

action, correct?
MR. CASTLETON:

21

It could, that's correct, Your

22

Honor.

But that's not before the court today.

What we're

23

talking about is simply whether he had any authority to

24

issue the letter he did,

25

substance of that letter was proper or not.

not necessarily whether the

8

1

I know the plaintiffs take great exception to

2

the fact that the assessor here did not look at the

3

memorandum of real estate contract and determine that that

4

could by itself confer ownership.

5

of briefing to say that that should serve by itself to

6

show the assessor that ownership was transferred.

7

that's not the issue with a writ of prohibition or a writ

8

of mandate.

9

authority to write the letter regardless of what the

They've expended a bit

But

The issue is whether the assessor had the

I don't think there is any authority that

10

substance was.

11

says he does not have that authority.
We've been working through this issue.

12

We've

13

been trying to make sure that our practices are in keeping

14

with the rest of the state.

15

they are.

16

the state, that they provide this as a service to

17

residents to let them know if there are any potential

18

issues with the ownership of property.

19

What we're finding is that

This was a common practice of assessors across

THE COURT:

Would you agree that making an

20

individual aware of a potential problem with property is

21

dramatically different than what happened in this instance

22

where there was an opinion regarding ownership?

23

two starkly different things, correct?

24

assertion of no ownership interest, the other is there

25

might be a problem here with your title.

9

Those are

One is an

1

MR. CASTLETON:

I think the wording certainly could

2

have been different, to say this was a concern or this is

3

something that we've identified.

4

assessor's office is right now working to make that more

5

appropriate, make that a better fit here.

6

I know that the

But even then the assessor's office has no
If a person

7

right or legal authority to change ownership.

8

doesn't agree with what the assessor's office does,

9

there's a recourse that they can take.

In this case, Your

10

Honor, the step that could have been taken, and that

11

ultimately was, was to produce that real estate contract.

12

THE COURT:

I agree a hundred percent with that.

13

think, had we had any common sense running around in this

14

case, this would have resolved within 24 hours.

15

one of the most frustrating things about this whole case

16

is that it wasn't.

That's

There was a race to the courthouse.

17

MR. CASTLETON:

18

court's sentiments on that.

19

perspective,

20

this is how we see it.

21

we see.

22

that he did in that letter.

23

well, this is correct,

24

memorandum of real estate contract so he can see -- not

25

the memorandum, but the actual contract.

Your Honor,

I understand the

I can tell you from our

I reached out from the beginning and said
This is the record of title that

This is why Mr. Cundick made the determination
And the response was not,

let's have him look at the

10

It was instead

I

1

filing an amended complaint.

2

associate, Mr. Williams, was here, the resolution let's

3

get that letter.

4

litigation here.

5

And then in October, when my

That's what we did, yet we're still in

It was our understanding that once he saw that

6

real estate contract that would resolve the writ issue in

7

and of itself.

8

fact that we were simply trying to maintain clear -- we

9

were trying to resolve the ambiguity, but that didn't

That's why we did it.

In addition to the

10

resolve it and here we are again.

11

try and lengthen the litigation here.

12

bring it to a close.

13

right thing to do to clear up the issue here.

14

It's not our intent to
It's our intent to

We've done what we feel was the

I want to touch upon quickly one thing Your

15

Honor said particularly with a writ of prohibition.

16

don't think it is the proper vehicle here.

17

the court identified other remedies that are available.

18

Certainly slander of title is one.

19

themselves have recognized that because they brought that

20

as a claim.

21

I

I think that

And the plaintiffs

The Idaho Supreme Court has said over and over

22

that these writs are to be used only in exceptional

23

circumstances.

24

appropriateness is not in doubt, meaning when the issue is

25

clear as to whether there was an action in excess of

They are only to be used when the

11

1

authority.

2

Here I don't think it is clear.

3

it's our position that he had the authority and it's a

4

legal issue before the court.

5

abundantly clear that what the assessor did was outside of

6

his authority and therefore a writ is an improper way to

7

try to address that.

8
9

Obviously

I don't think it is

Additionally, you can't address a writ, a writ
of prohibition, to a past act.

That's what we're trying

10

to do here in one sense, which is this is an act that

11

happened back in May of 2015 with that letter.

12

has been resolved.

13

that the assessor's office is currently in the process of

14

doing.

The issue

There's nothing for this court to do

15

I think that it is improper to try and put a

16

writ in place, or even a temporary restraining order for

17

that matter, to say, well, we're going to put that in

18

place because at some point in the future you may or may

19

not take this action again.

20

assessor's office currently in play right now, there's no

21

reason for the court to step in and take any action.

22

speculative at best.

23

before the court in which to apply the circumstance.

24
25

Certainly,

If there's no action at the

It's

There is no current controversy

just to conclude, Your Honor, the

issue of standing raises its head again.

12

I don't believe

1

the Westovers have standing to try and assert any type of

2

relief on behalf of other individuals in the county.

3

don't know who those individual are.

4

speculative, saying this may happen in the future.

5

extent that this applies to anybody but the Westovers

6

themselves, there's no standing to raise that.

7

standing to try and seek the court's relief on behalf of

8

someone else unless they were, you know, in some

9

circumstance that's not here today, Your Honor.

10

They

It's all
To the

There's no

I think that it's clear, and I want to make

11

sure that I'm clear, the issue of a writ of mandate is now

12

passed.

13

don't think that's what they are seeking anymore.

14

wanted to be clear.

15

issues on that.

16

I gathered that from the plaintiffs' briefing.

THE COURT:

If I'm wrong,

I

I

just

I can address our

I'm prepared to address both.

The

17

motion is for issuance of a writ of mandamus and

18

prohibition.

19

his statement here today that his focus today is on a writ

20

of prohibition, but I'm prepared to rule on both today.

21
22

I did read Mr. Atkins's brief and I heard

•

MR. CASTLETON:

Okay.

Subject to questions, that's

all I have.

23

THE COURT:

All right.

24

MR. ATKIN:

The only thing I would say is that this

25

Mr. Atkin.

wasn't a race to the courthouse on the part of my clients.

13

There were several

1

This letter was issued in May.

2

attempts to contact the assessor and we talked to some

3

people.
THE COURT:

4

And, Mr. Atkin,

I hope you don't take

5

offense personally at that.

When I say a race to the

6

courthouse,

7

just would have hoped -- I think emotions were running

8

high.

9

their complaint.

I'm not assessing blame with you per se.

I

Your clients wanted some immediacy with respect to
I'm not suggesting in any way,

shape or
I'm just

10

form that you or your clients violated Rule 11.

11

thinking in a broader sense -- I'll just put it on the

12

record.

13

run down to Mr. Cundick's office and said here is our

14

deed.

15

know that that's what is hanging you up is that there's

16

not a deed recorded in the assessor's office, but here's

17

the reasons why and we'll let you look at it.

18

want the family members to see it.

19

issues in here.

20

have been gone in 24 hours.

21

I think that you and your clients ought to have

I know there's sensitive information in there and I

We don't

There are sensitive

It would have then been gone.

MR. ATKIN:

It would

Actually the deed was recorded even

22

before the letter was sent to the power company.

23

to point that out.

24

letter that we wrote.

25

THE COURT:

We tried

We pointed that out in the formal

I didn't know that.

14

Okay.

Mr.

1

Castleton.

2

MR. CASTLETON:

I would just add for the record

3

that the deed was recorded, but administratively was not

4

available to the assessor until after the letter had been

5

sent.

6

point.

So it wasn't available for his review at that

THE COURT:

7

I think it's extremely unfortunate -- well,

8

this.

9

prepared to rule.

10

But, again, that is my perception on
I'm

Does anyone want to talk to me further

about anything at this point in time?

11

MR. ATKIN:

Nothing further.

12

MR. CASTLETON:

13

THE COURT:

No.

I think it's extremely unfortunate that

14

the time and effort has gone into this that has gone into

15

it.

16

attorney fees and costs that need not have been incurred.

17

I think it results in Franklin County incurring attorney

18

fees and costs that need not have been incurred in this

19

matter.

I think it results in the Westovers incurring

20

I was hopeful it would be brought to

21

conclusion at mediation.

That wasn't successful in every

22

respect, although it was successful in some respects,

23

think, because it resulted in the letter and those kinds

24

of issues.

25

that.

I

So there was some productivity with respect to

15

1

I guess, before I rule, Mr. Castleton, are you

2

asserting any kind of objection at this point in time to

3

dismissing the other claims without prejudice, the slander

4

of title and those issues?
MR. CASTLETON:

5

We do.

We stated that it's our

6

preference that we just deal with those now.

7

without prejudice I think will most assuredly mean they

8

come up again.

9

litigation going forward, we might as well address those

I think that now that we've got the

10

while we still have a proceeding going.

11

position on it.

12
13

That's our

THE COURT:

Do you want to respond to that, Mr.

MR. ATKIN:

Really nothing more to say, Your Honor.

Atkin?

14
15

Ruling on it

We have moved to dismiss without prejudice.

16

THE COURT:

The court is going to, over the

17

objection of the defendant in this matter, grant the

18

motion to dismiss the remaining claims without prejudice.

19

I would hope that a close scrutiny is given with respect

20

to whether or not those claims are reasserted in the

21

future.

22

I should disclose that I did have a brief

23

conversation with Judge Dunn regarding the mediation.

24

understand that that may have been one of the primary

25

stumbling blocks about having a complete and final

16

I

1

resolution over this matter.

2

with prejudice at this point in time.

3

dismiss without prejudice with that caution to the

4

Westovers.

5

viability of the action, the cost associated with it, the

6

risks associated with any litigation.

7

specifically, the risk associated with that specific

8

litigation.

9

I'm not going to dismiss
I'm going to

I hope that they will closely consider the

And more

I will grant the request of Mr. Atkin in this

10

matter on behalf of his clients that that claim be

11

dismissed without prejudice, or those claims.

12

more than the slander of title?

13

interference with contract and prospective economic

14

advantage?

Was there

There was tortious

15

MR. ATKIN:

That's correct.

16

THE COURT:

So those claims will be dismissed at

17

this point in time without prejudice.

18

With respect to the writ of mandamus issue,

19

the court is going to deny the request for a writ of

20

mandamus in this matter.

21

as follows:

22

Supreme Court or any district court to any inferior

23

tribunal, corporation, board, or person to compel the

24

performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as

25

a duty resulting from an office."

Idaho Code section 7-302 reads

"A writ of mandamus may be issued by the

17

1

Specifically the court finds that a writ of

2

mandamus would be an appropriate extraordinary writ for

3

this court to issue to an inferior board, person, tribunal

4

or corporation.

5

Franklin County would fit within the statutory definition

6

of an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.

7

And that under appropriate circumstances, the court would

8

be authorized to issue an extraordinary writ in this

9

particular instance.

10

The court pays -- I misspoke when I said

11

treasurer.

12

matter.

13

I hereby find that the treasurer for

I apologize.

It would be assessor in this

The court has paid particular attention to the

14

phrase especially enjoins.

15

enjoining an action in terms of injunctive relief and Rule

16

65 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

17

the occasion to look up the word enjoin and the word

18

enjoin means to prescribe with authority or emphasize.

19

as we apply the definition of enjoin to that statute, we

20

could replace especially enjoins with especially directs

21

as a duty of the resulting office.

22

We oftentimes think of

I actually took

So

Again, this goes to the statutorily authorized

23

duties of an assessor.

24

writ of mandate would be appropriate if there was a

25

specific direction within the statute that the assessor

In this particular instance, the

18

1

perform a certain conduct.

2

that would make Mr. Cundick's actions in this matter the

3

subject of especially directing or enjoining an activity.

4

Meaning that he has an expressed statutory duty to do what

5

he did in this case.

6

is not a basis for an issuance of a writ of mandate either

7

back at the initiation of this lawsuit or today in this

8

matter.

9

issuance of a writ of mandate.

10

I see nothing in this record

Therefore the court finds that there

So the court will deny the request for the

I also find, pursuant to 703, the absence of

11

an adequate remedy,

12

where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in

13

the ordinary course of law."

14

specific act that Mr. Cundick, as the assessor of Franklin

15

County, was required to perform pursuant to statute, and

16

was not so performing, I believe that those facts don't

17

exist under the facts and circumstances of this case.

18

"The writ must be issued in all cases

But if they did,

Again, if there was a

I also believe that there

19

would be an appropriate legal recourse and remedy under

20

the issues in this case dealing with the Westovers' real

21

property, easement rights, and those kinds of issues,

22

where an appropriate legal remedy, plain, speedy, and

23

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law could

24

have been achieved through the filing of a request for a

25

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

19

1

So also on that basis the court will deny the request for

2

a writ of mandamus.

3

As it relates to the writ of prohibition, the

4

code also defines the writ of prohibition in the following

5

terms.

6

402.

7

of a writ of mandate.

8

tribunal, corporation, board, or person when such persons

9

are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such

10
11

Idaho Code 7-402 indicates -- excuse me.

401, not

It defines a writ of prohibition as the counterpart
It arrests the proceedings of any

tribunal.
Mr. Castleton and I have had a little bit of a

12

dialog here today concerning whether or not the conduct

13

and actions of the assessor's office in this case were

14

statutorily authorized.

15

that issue, but I don't need to make a specific finding of

16

fact regarding that.

17

be resolved based upon 402 in this matter.

18

may be issued by the Supreme Court or any district court

19

to an inferior tribunal or to a corporation, board, or

20

person in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy,

21

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

22

I think we likely disagree on

I believe that this case, again, can
402 says,

"It

Under the facts and circumstances of this

23

particular case the court believes that there would have

24

been a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law in the

25

ordinary course of law had the defendant, or, excuse me,

20

1

the plaintiffs, back when this matter was initially filed,

2

filed this request for injunctive relief pursuant to Idaho

3

Rule of Civil Procedure 65,

4

restraining order and a preliminary injunction to follow

5

from that, if they felt that Mr. Cundick was exercising

6

authority outside of his statutory authorized functions as

7

the assessor of Franklin County.

8
9

seeking both a temporary

So the court, although I think I disagree with
Mr. Castleton on whether or not Mr. Cundick had the

10

authority to send out the letters that he does, and did in

11

this particular case,

12

that is being requested in this matter, which is subject

13

to great caution by the appellate courts in this case,

14

would mandate that the court deny that request on the

15

basis that there was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

16

at law in the ordinary course of the law through the

17

filing of a request for injunctive relief in this matter.

18

Based upon that, the court will also deny the

19
20

I think that the extraordinary writ

request for a writ of prohibition in this matter.
Based upon those issues, it would be the

21

court's intent to file a judgment of dismissal dismissing

22

the slander of title claim and the tortious interference

23

with contract or prospective economic advantage claim

24

without prejudice and dismissing the request for writ of

25

prohibition and writ of mandamus with prejudice in this

21

1

matter.

That will be the order of the court at this time.

2

I will enter a judgment to that effect.

3
4
5

6
7

Mr. Atkin, any questions or matters you would
like to place on the record?
MR. ATKIN:

No, Your Honor.

Would you like me to

prepare that order?
THE COURT:

I'll prepare the judgment.

In dealing

8

with the Idaho Supreme Court anymore, and having had as

9

many judgments returned as I have had,

10

I've taken it upon

myself to create my own judgments.

11

MR. ATKIN:

Fair enough.

12

THE COURT:

If they're going to send it back,

13

let them send it back to me.

14

Mr. Castleton, anything else today?

15

MR. CASTLETON:

16

THE COURT:

17
18

I'll

this time.

No, Your Honor.

Thank you.

With that, then, we'll be in recess at

Thank you.
(Hearing concluded.)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

22

1

2
3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN

VAL D WESTOVER,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO COMPEL AND IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
V.

IDAHO COUNTIES RISK
MANGEMENT PROGRAM (ICRMP),

Case No. CV-2016-195

Defendant.
Judge: Brown

On June 24, 2016, Plaintiff Val D Westover served discovery requests on ICRMP. On
July 19, 2016, ICRMP responded to requests for admission, but refused to respond to
interrogatories or document requests and instead filed a motion for protective order claiming that
there are no factual issues in the case and the case is merely a legal question of whether local
subdivisions may legally purchase insurance. ICRMP has now filed a motion for summary
judgment. The motion for protective order and the motion for summary judgment miss the point.
The premise of the motions, that discovery is irrelevant since local governments are
statutorily entitled to buy insurance that will reimburse tort claimants under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act misses the point. Further, a motion for protective order is not an appropriate method
1

to object to discovery considered to be irrelevant.

The ultimate issues in this case or any case

should not be litigated in a discovery dispute, and Rule 56 makes it clear that a party is entitled to
discovery before being required to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Rule 56( d),
Idaho R. Civ. P.
That normal fleshing out of factual issues is as necessary in this case as in any other.
That a local government may legally purchase insurance in the context of a tort claim has little
relevance to the issues in this case. The purpose of tort law, and in particular the tort claims act,
is to provide for compensation for injured persons. LC. § 6-903 et. seq. It is clear from a perusal
of the Tort Claims Act that the legislature did not care in that context who footed the bill. In that
context, insurance is not only permissible, but no doubt desirable from the tort victim's
standpoint because it provides a ready fund for compensation.

On the other hand, the purpose

of LC. § 12-117(3) is to achieve some modicum of local responsibility for unreasonable conduct
will be greatly undermined iflocal government officials are able to purchase insurance coverage
that prevents attorney fee awards for violating the legal rights of citizens without a reasonable
basis in fact or law from coming from the regular operating budget of that government.
Recently the Supreme Court tried to limit the effectiveness of LC.§ 12-117(3) in
curtailing the abuse of local government. See, Smith v. Washington County, 149 Idaho 787,241
P .3d 960 (2010). The legislature responded with amendments in 2012 that made it clear their
intent that Idaho Code 12-117(3) was not to be watered down by the Courts to prevent its full
impact in protecting citizens from local governments and to dis-incentivize such conduct:
Until the summer of 2009, Idaho Code Section 12-117 was interpreted by the Idaho
Supreme Court to allow an award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in
administrative cases if the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. Following an Idaho Supreme Court ruling in the summer of 2009 which
reinterpreted the statute to bar such awards, HB 421 was passed by the 2010 Legislature
and signed into law with the objective of allowing such awards at all stages of an
2

administrative proceeding, including on appeal to the courts. Nonetheless, on October 6,
2010 the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Washington County, 149 Idaho 787,241
P.3d 960 (2010), that the 2010 amendments did not accomplish this objective. This bill
adds additional language to Idaho Code Section 12-117 to correct this situation. It also
amends Idaho Code Section 12-117 to cover health districts (which are not technically
regarded as state agencies), to provide that the prevailing party in lawsuits between
governmental entities is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs as a disincentive to
such suits, and to make technical corrections.
Statement of Purpose, S.B. 1332 (2012).
That is the issue raised in this lawsuit. Whether insurance being provided by ICRM to
local government officials is having the effect of thwarting the legislative purpose in the
enactment of Idaho Code § 12-117 by shifting the burden of paying attorney fees awarded for
government action that is without a basis in fact or law from the offending party's operating
budget to ICRMP's insurance pool. Mr. Westover's discovery requests were specifically tailored
to find the answer to that question. ICRMP's obfuscation in response to the requests for
admission and its refusal to respond to the interrogatories and document requests has made it
impossible for the Court to answer this rather straightforward question.

ARGUMENT
Our Rules of Civil Procedure define the scope of discovery. Rule 26(b )( I )(A) provides
the simple formula:

General Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party's claim or defense, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action.
Tellingly, the rule continues: "Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Issues relating to what might be admissible at trial are not litigated at the discovery stage. Mr.
3

Westover's discovery was specifically directed to the question of whether ICRMP policies
interfere with the legislative directive found in Idaho Code § 12-117 designed to bring
accountability to local government by making them feel the consequence of their conduct in their
operating budget. Mr. Westover's discovery is aimed precisely at that pivotal point and is highly
likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Interrogatory No. 1 is a typical request to provide a factual basis for failing to admit
critical issues in the case. Such interrogatories not only help frame the issues that might be
ultimately tried, but provide a buffer against the type of evasive answers to requests for
admission that were submitted in this case. ICRMP's answers to those requests for admission
are a model of obfuscation whenever the request neared the critical issues in this case.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #1: Admit that you have the duty and the right to

defend your members against lawsuits brought against them by citizens subject to their
jurisdiction.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it is contractually obligated to provide a defense to
its insureds when they are sued for claims that are potentially entitled to coverage under the
ICRMP insurance policy. ICRMP denies the remainder of Request No. 1.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #2: Admit that you have the right to control the

litigation tendered to you by your members.
RESPONSE: ICRMP admits that, consistent with the terms and conditions of the

insurance policy purchased by its insureds, it has a contractual right to make strategic decisions
concerning litigation involving claims that are entitled to coverage under the ICRMP policy.
Defendant denies the remainder of Request No. 2.

4

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #3: Admit that you have the right to control settlement
and mediation of litigation tendered to you by your members.

RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 2, above.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #7: Admit that on July 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed an
action against the Franklin County Assessor in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Case No.
CV-2015-312. ("The Assessor Lawsuit")

RESPONSE: It is admitted that there exists a case styled Westover v. Cundick, et al,
Case No. CV-2015-312 in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Franklin County, Idaho.
When specifically asked requests for admission on the ultimate issues in this lawsuit
(which is specifically allowed under Rule 30, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure),

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #4: Admit that you have the duty to pay any expenses
awarded against your members in lawsuits tendered to you by your members, including actions
covered by Idaho Code Section 12-117.

RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #11: Admit that you refused to authorize the Franklin
County Assessor to pay any money in settlement of the Assessor Lawsuit during that mediation.

RESPONSE: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is
ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a
legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.

5

Request No. 13 is denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #14: Admit that any payment that you make toward
attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will be paid from
funds you collect and pool from all your members.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,
and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #15: Admit that any payment that you make toward
attorney fees that might be awarded to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit will not be paid from
funds in the regular operating budget of the Franklin County Assessor.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, calls for a legal conclusion,
and is dependent upon facts which have not occurred and may not ever occur. As such, the
request is denied.
ICRMP denied the requests, hence the need for a response to the first interrogatory
spelling out the factual basis for denial. Similarly, in response to a requests about the
jurisdictional basis for this lawsuit, Plaintiff was given evasive answers:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #6: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is a
political subdivision.

RESPONSE: Denied as phrased.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #8: Admit that the Franklin County Assessor is
and was at the time the Assessor Lawsuit was filed one of your members.

RESPONSE: Objection; the request as phrased is a compound request. It is admitted
only that Franklin County was an insured ofICRMP. The remainder of the request is denied.
6

Obviously, the contract by which ICRMP was obligated to provide a defense to the
lawsuit brought by Mr. Westover against the Assessor (Interrogatory No. 2), may shed light on
whether the insurance practices ofICRMP undermine the legislative purposes of LC. §12-117.
If that contract provides that ICRMP will pay a judgment for attorney fees despite a ruling by the

Court that the assessor acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law," the purposes of LC.
§ 12-117 will be thwarted. Curiously, in response to Request for Admission No. 13, ICRMP
instead of giving a forthright admission or denial as required by the rules, instead obfuscated by
reference to this contract that it now refuses to produce!
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #13: Admit that if the Franklin County Assessor is

ordered to pay attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit you will be obligated to pay
those fees on behalf of the Franklin County Assessor.
RESPONSE: Objection; the request is vague, speculative, and calls for a

legal conclusion. Any obligation by ICRMP to indemnify the Franklin County Assessor is
controlled by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy purchased by Franklin County.
Request No. 13 is denied.
Interrogatory No. 3 is directly to the point: "Please identify the source of any payments
that have been made, or that will be made or for which there is an obligation to be made to
reimburse attorney fees to the Plaintiff in the Assessor Lawsuit in the event that a court orders
the Franklin County Assessor to pay attorney fees in connection with that lawsuit." Any
payment of attorney fees to the plaintiff in the Assessor lawsuit will be on the basis that the
Assessor's position in that lawsuit was "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The
legislature specifically required that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political
subdivision pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of
7

the state agency or political subdivision." I.C. §12-117 (3). Obviously, if ICRMP were
obligated to pay those fees and is the source of those payments the legislative purpose in making
sure that irresponsible actions by local government officials is felt at the local level so as to be a
deterrent to future local government irresponsibility will be undermined.
The remaining three interrogatories (mistakenly all numbered No. 3) simply ask for the
identifying information relating to witnesses, expert witnesses, and persons with knowledge of
the facts.

Rule 26 specifically makes that information discoverable. Rule 26(b)(l)(A). It is

difficult to imagine a proper objection to such information.
Mr. Westover's document requests were similarly all seeking discoverable evidence and
were specifically aimed at facts relevant to the pivotal issue in this case of whether a local
government official has purchased insurance that has the potential of thwarting the goal of I.C.
§ 12-117 to bring accountability to local government conduct by requiring them to pay attorney
fees incurred by their constituents fighting battles that should never have been fought.

Whether ICRMP Made the Right Call in Not Participating in the Mediation in
Good Faith is Not Relevant

I.

ICRMP makes the argument that it made the correct call when it would not allow the
Assessor to offer any settlement at the mediation because when the parties returned to Court the
Assessor prevailed in having Mr. Westover's claims for Writ of mandamus/prohibition
dismissed.

That argument misses the point for two reasons. The Court will recall that the

Westover's complaint was dismissed, not because the Court found that the Assessor's conduct
had been lawful. Indeed, the Court chastised the Assessor for inserting himself into this real
estate transaction only because no statute prohibited him from doing so.

8

THE COURT: Enough of this for a minute. Mr. Williams, why is your client so intent on
picking this fight, which seems to exceed perhaps what his role as an elected official with
the Franklin County Assessor's office would be? Why does he concern himself with this
issue?
MR. WILLIAMS: We attempted to resolve this matter back in August. We sent a letter to
Mr. Atkin that said basically this is moot, there's now a deed in place.
THE COURT: But that's not my question. Why did he involve himself in the first
instance? Does he have any responsibility to notify Rocky Mountain Power, or a third
party, that he feels like a filing with the recorder's office should be responded to or that
he should police those issues?
MR. WILLIAMS: That's the practice of the assessor's office and has been for a number
of years. When there is a question as to ownership -THE COURT: Again, it might be a practice, but is there any legal or statutory authority
that he do that?
MR. WILLIAMS: There is no authority to prohibit him from doing it.
THE COURT: And in fact he holds himself out to a lawsuit such as this if he's incorrect
in his legal assessment of the state of affairs, correct?
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, correct. As we now know. 1
Transcript of Hearing held Jl-12-2015, p.p. 15-16.
This action is not premised on the outcome of the litigation between the plaintiff and the
Assessor. Rather, this action is a challenge to an insurance regime that thwarts the legislative
effort to get local government to stay within the law and not embark on the kind of rogue efforts
that spawned the litigation between this plaintiff and the Assessor. Similarly what happened at
the mediation is relevant only for the fact that it illustrates an evil that needs to be eradicated.
The purpose of LC. § 12-117 is to take away the incentive of local government officials to be
stubbornly litigious. What happened to the Westovers is not the basis for this action, but it is a
textbook example of what happens when local governments take action to thwart the legislative

1 MR. ATKIN: The other position that the assessor takes that causes me and my clients grave concern is that the assessor takes the position that
what he did in this case was a discretionary function because there's nothing in the statute that prohibits him from doing the things that he did.
That is not my understanding of what a discretionaty function for a government official is.
Discretionary function doesn't mean that because the statute doesn't prohibit the government official from doing something therefore he's free to
do it. My understanding of a discretionary function is the way it's defined in the tort claims act, a discretionary function is something for which
the government actor is shielded because he is performing a duty that was properly delegated to him under statute or regulation.
THE COURT: And in fact that's ho\\ governmental entities work, correct?
MR. ATKIN: That's correct.
THE COURT: They have no authority to act unless there is statutory authority for them to so act, correct?
Transcript olllearing ludd 2-l l-16. p.p. 3-4.
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intent that the consequences of unfounded and stubborn conduct be felt in their operating budget.
A local government official is less likely to ignore the plea of his constituent to correct a
wrongful interference with a business transaction if he knows he will feel it locally ifhe persists
in his stubborn refusal. He is less likely to defend arbitrary conduct "because there is not statute
that prohibits his conduct" if he knows that taking that kind of position in court is likely to ding
his local operating budget. In short, the stubborn refusal of the Assessor to correct the false
statement he made to the power company in a letter he had no business writing would be far less
likely to have occurred if the Assessor had not had insurance coverage that would pay the fees
incurred by his constituents in getting him to get off his stubborn refusal to simply correct his
wrongs.
If full and complete responses to the discovery that the plaintiff has propounded show
that the indemnification provided by ICRMP will cover awards made to citizens who meet
stubborn litigiousness from their local government officials who have acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or in law, then this action is proper and summary judgment will need to be granted
to the Plaintiff.
The Assessor, without any statutory or other authority to do so, wrote a letter to the
Westovers' Grantee the power company, telling it that the Westovers were not the owners of the
property over which they had granted a power easement. That ultra vires act threatened to
disrupt the Westovers' contract and power to their facility. This conduct was without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
The Westovers reached out to the Assessor, several times personally, several times
through their lawyer, and finally through a formal demand letter, asking the Assessor to correct
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the error he had made through the ultra vires letter to the power company. Their pleas went
unheeded. This conduct was without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Seeing no alternative, the Westovers brought legal action against the Assessor to have the
court order him through a writ of mandamus to retract his statement to the power company that
the Westovers did not own the property.
Rather than simply retract the false statement in a letter he had no business writing, the
Assessor filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the W estovers did not have standing to seek
legal help to get the ultra vires letter retracted. That conduct was without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.
Ultimately, the Assessor did issue the retraction letter telling the power company that the
Westovers did in fact own the property over which they had conveyed the easement. But that
retraction letter came after months of unnecessary delay, and thousands of dollars in attorney
fees.
At no time was the Assessor able to articulate any reasonable basis in fact or law for his
issuance of the letter to the power company, and more importantly for his reluctance to simply
correct the error at the request of the W estovers until after they had spent months worrying about
their ability to continue their business and thousands of dollars in attorney fees. That prolonged
conduct was "without a reasonable basis in fact or law. "
J.C. § 12-117 requires that where a political subdivision of the State in litigation with a
private citizen has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or Jaw, the court shall award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The legislature went further, requiring that the brunt of
the attorney fee award be felt by the political subdivision and not be passed off. J.C. § 12-117 (3)
specifically states that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political subdivision
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pursuant to this section shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of the state
agency or political subdivision."
If ICRMP offers insurance to political subdivisions against attorney fees awards under
LC. § 12-117(3), it negates the effect of that section and the legislative intent to bring rationality
into the actions of local government through the threat that, if they lose, and if they are found to
have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law they will have to pay an attorney fee award
out of their regular operating budget.
Throughout this ordeal, the Westovers could never understand why the Assessor ignored
their pleas, spent thousands of dollars on litigation defending conduct for which there is no
statutory authority. Why did he not simply issue the retraction letter which he finally issued
months and thousands of dollars later. At the mediation they learned the reason. The reason was
ICRMP. By illegally insuring against the eventuality of an attorney fee award that needed to be
felt in the local operating budget, ICRMP had removed both the incentive and the power of the
Assessor to act reasonably.
What happened at the mediation, and what happened ultimately in the case (which is
currently on appeal) is beside the point and is being used by ICRMP as a red herring. Obviously
the legislature, in enacting LC. § 12-117(3) was not looking for a new way for litigants to get
money from local governments. Rather they had a loftier goal in mind. That of promoting
rational and legal conduct on the part of local government. That is what the Westovers were
deprived of in this case. True, they hope one day as a result of their appeal to be compensated
for the wringer the Assessor ran them through, but whether they ever prevail on that goal, they
have been damaged by having to deal with a local government official who would not, or
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because of his contract with ICRMP could not act rationally and legally in the way that he
conducted the litigation with the W estovers.
At this point, because ICRMP refused to respond to discovery this Court must assume
that the facts after discovery will show that ICRMP agreed to indemnify the Assessor if an award
of attorney fees were assessed for violation of LC. § 12-117. ICRMP had a contractual
arrangement with the Assessor that interfered with the Assessor's handling of the litigation so
that he was precluded from acting in the manner that he felt was reasonable and legal. If those
facts tum out to be true, which the Court must assume because of the premature nature of the
motion for summary judgment and ICRMP's refusal to comply with the discovery rules, then
ICRMP is a pernicious organization whose purpose is to annul the legislative pronouncement of
LC. § 12-117, and it must be stopped.

II.

Plaintiff Has Standing to Sue Defendant for Violation of I.C. § 12-117
ICRMP argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to sue in this case, because Plaintiffs

cannot maintain a direct cause of action against an insurance company. While it may be true an
injured third party cannot bring a direct action against a tortfeasor's insurance company,
generally, that is not the basis for Plaintiffs standing in this case. ICRMP's argument
completely misses the mark. Plaintiffs basis for standing is that ICRMP violated LC.§ 12-117
and Plaintiff was injured by this statutory violation. The insurance contract itself is the statutory
violation and the source of Plaintiffs injury.
As explained in detail above the main issue in this case is whether or not ICRMP's
assistance of governmental entities in paying attorney fees awards made against governmental
entities under LC.§ 12-117 is in fact a violation of that statutory mandate in J.C.§ 12-117 (3)
that "Expenses awarded against a state agency or political subdivision pursuant to this section
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shall be paid from funds in the regular operating budget of the state agency or political
subdivision."

ICRMP insurance policy appears to enable these entities to avoid the purpose of

this statute by shifting the risk of loss to an insurance pool, rather that the governmental agency
having to shoulder the cost burden directly as § 12-117 intends. As a result, litigants are
subjected to the kind of unfounded, baseless refusal by the government official to correct his
ultra vires conduct early on that the Plaintiffs experienced in their litigation with the Assessor.
Plaintiff has standing to sue because he is claiming that under the circumstances of this
case ICRMP violated LC. § 12-117 and that such violation was the proximate cause of an injury
suffered by Plaintiff, namely being subjected to litigation with a government official taking a
position for which there was no reasonable basis in fact or law, and a governmental official who
persists in that baseless position to this day. A party may sue based on a violation of a statute.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that: "When deciding whether a party has standing, we have
looked to decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance." Kock v. Canyon County,
177 P.3d 372, 375; 145 Idaho 158 (Idaho 2008). A party has standing to claim a statutory
violation if that party has suffered or is about to suffer an "injury in fact" to his interests by a
violation of a statute. Id.; Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). The
alleged injury may be as non-specific as "harm in fact affects the recreational or even the mere
esthetic interests of the plaintiff' to suffice as support for standing. Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs injury was the failure of the Assessor to make a good faith effort
to determine the legality of his actions and not persist in them simply because "there is no
authority to prohibit him from doing it!"
Likewise he would appear to have a duty to take part in Court ordered mediation in the
case of Westover v. Franklin County Assessor Case No. CV-2015-312. The reason the Assessor
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did not participate in the mediation in good faith is because ICRMP was directing that litigation
and instructed the Assessor not to participate in a meaningful way at the mediation. ICRMP
would be liable to pay any settlement amount, rather than Franklin County directly from its
operating budget as LC. § 12-117(3) requires. It appears obvious that the Assessor would be
much more inclined to resolve the matter by settlement, and would have retracted his slanderous
letter early on, if any settlement were to be paid by the County directly. This is enough of an
"injury in fact" to support standing.
Plaintiff has alleged that ICRMP (as well as the Franklin County Assessor), under the
circumstances of the case, violated the intent and purpose of LC. § 12-117 by providing
insurance for any loss incurred because of the Assessor's unreasonable actions, rather than
requiring the Assessor to pay directly out of his operating funds as the statute requires. This
violation caused harm to plaintiff by the Assessor stubbornly refusing to retract his false
statements about the plaintiff's title to the property and by not participating in good faith in Court
ordered mediation. Plaintiff has standing to bring this case against ICRMP.

CONCLUSION
This Court should deny ICRMP's Motion for Summary Judgement and grant plaintiff's
Motion to Compel ICRMP's response to discovery. Plaintiff should be awarded his fees in
having to bring a Motion to Compel.

DA TED this 141h day of September, 2016.
Atkin Law Offices, P.C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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